Tuesday, 25 November 2008

Altri 800 miliardi dalla FED

«The Federal Reserve, in another massive life-support intervention for the U.S. financial system, on Tuesday announced a $600 billion program to buy mortgage-related debt and securities and a $200 billion facility to support consumer debt securities,

The U.S. central bank said it would buy up to $100 billion in debt issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks, the government-sponsored mortgage finance enterprises.

The Fed also said it would buy up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.

The move is intended to strike at the heart of U.S. economic woes, the collapsed housing market.

"This action is being taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved financial conditions more generally," the Fed said in a statement.

The central bank also launched a $200 billion facility to back consumer loans, including student, auto, and credit card loans and loans backed by the federal Small Business Administration».

Modiano analizza la crisi

Su Il Sussidiario.net una interessante analisi di Pietro Modiano circa le ragioni della crisi finanziaria.

«Qual è allora la sua interpretazione?

La genesi è dovuta a un eccesso straordinario di liquidità creatosi dopo l’11 settembre e col fatto che negli Usa si tendeva a favorire l’indebitamento delle famiglie a scopo anticiclico o addirittura sociale. La somma di grande liquidità e basso rischio ha prodotto una riduzione dei tassi di interesse e un’abbondanza di credito in tutto il mondo che ha fatto del gran bene al pianeta. Però i bassi tassi di interesse hanno messo in condizione le banche di non guadagnare abbastanza per capitale impiegato e hanno generato nelle banche la tendenza a vendere i propri rischi di credito e a comprare rischi di credito altrui, attraverso strumenti derivati o altro, comunque credito trasformato in titoli. Questo ha prodotto, a parità di assorbimento di capitale delle banche, un’assunzione di rischi di credito enormemente superiore a quello che ci sarebbe stato in assenza della leva.

Più delicato è il tema delle “responsabilità” di malfunzionamento individuale o sistemico…

L’utilizzo degli strumenti di finanza sofisticata è stato un comportamento certamente razionale da parte di ogni singolo banchiere, e ognuno aveva il dovere di utilizzarlo perché era un modo legittimo, nell’era dei bassi tassi di interesse, per produrre reddito per le proprie banche a parità di capitale. L’effetto sistemico si è rivelato devastante quando si è capito che il mercato non dava i segnali giusti sui rischi di credito: il mercato, fino a quel momento, non aveva mai “segnalato” l’eccesso di credito. Lo ha fatto con una catastrofe.

Come e quando è accaduto?

Quando un americano di troppo ha deciso di non rimborsare il suo mutuo – o di rimborsare i prestiti meno di quanto previsto: e allora tutti i portafogli di credito hanno visto ridotto il loro valore, compromettendo il poco capitale delle banche che in essi avevano investito. Questo ha prodotto un effetto domino. Fin qui non c’è stata una cattiva volontà del bancario. Poi si può anche dire: “avete spinto i ritorni sul capitale di ogni singola banca troppo avanti perché avevate le stock options…” questo non spiega però il problema principale: perché, di fronte all’eccesso, il mercato non ha dato i segnali propri dell’eccesso?

Qual è la sua risposta?

Nessuno individualmente ha capito che si era di fronte a un eccesso. Perché non è emerso è il problema vero. Un mercato super efficiente come il mercato finanziario, se non produce prezzi che segnalano e danno la misura dell’entità delle tensioni in campo, presenti e future, è un mercato che non funziona. Ma questo significa negare in radice la teoria economica sulla quale abbiamo messo in piedi il mondo che conosciamo degli ultimi venti, forse trent’anni. Ed è un problema serio, quello sul quale più mi interrogo. Vuol dire che sul mercato che, nella storia, più si è avvicinato a quello della concorrenza perfetta, per disponibilità di informazioni, numero di operatori, dimensioni e strumenti i prezzi “non hanno funzionato”».



Monday, 24 November 2008

Citi: quando il risk managament è colluso

Sul New York Times è apparso un articolo qualche giorno fa nel quale viene messa in luce l'inadeguatezza del sistema di risk management di Citigroup. Il ritratto che ne esce è davvero impietoso.

Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets

La rabbia di Barry

Barry Ritholtz nel suo blog The Big Picture esprime stamani tutta la sua rabbia circa il piano di salvataggio di Citi.

Citi Bailout

Anche la stampa inizia a risentire della crisi


Negli USA le spese pubblicitarie hanno subito un calo del 20% nel settore del lusso, imponendo agli editori importanti tagli di costi.

NYTimes.com

L'agenda di Citi nello scorso fine settimana


The majority of you voted in yesterday’s poll that Citigroup was not likely to survive the weekend as an independent entity. C’s board is meeting this weekend - and the agenda probably goes something like this:

9:oo AM: convene.

9:15 AM: openly question what is affecting Prince Alwaleed’s brain and causing him to support Vikram Bandit. Attempt to determine if it is hashish. Attempt to determine if board should inquire as to the source of his hashish and attempt to procure.

9:3o - 1o:3o AM: Vikram Bandit Happy Time Dartboard Hour

1o:3o-11:3o AM: Early lunch of macaroni and cheese provided by Dick Parsons. Print is dead. Someone suggests going to check out the End The Fed rally and gets kicked out of the room

11:45 AM: Roberto Hernández Ramírez writes up a TARP application for Banco Nacional de Mexico while everyone else plays Brickbreaker. Asks board to sign it in support

Noon-1:ooPM: Various four year olds are brought into the room to coach board on proper whine-pitch for “begging voice”

1:oo - 6:oo PM: Blackberries are reallocated from Brickbreaker to repeatedly dialing Hank Paulson’s home/cell/office/wife/dog, Neel Kashkari’s home/cell/office/wife/dog, pleading for cash

6:15 PM: Meeting ends. C. Michael Armstrong reminds everyone to pick up a NYTimes tomorrow to check out the bitchin’ full page Citi Never Sleeps ad.

Okay, they are really supposed to be discussing whether or not to sell off the business units The Bandit claims they won’t be selling off, whether or not they want to retain The Bandit as chair, or whether they are going to sell off the whole shebang. My money is, of course, on government intervention and a shareholder wipeout. Watch this space…

LOLFed.com

Il piano di salvataggio per Citigroup

Summary of Terms 

Eligible Asset Guarantee 

Eligible Assets: Asset pool consisting of loans and securities backed by residential real
estate and commercial real estate, and their associated hedges, as agreed,
and other such assets as the U.S. Government (USG) has agreed to
guarantee. Each specific asset must be identified on signing of guarantee
agreement. Assets will remain on the books of institution but will be
appropriately “ring-fenced.”

Size: Up to $306 bn in assets to be guaranteed (based on valuation agreed upon
between institution and USG).

Term of Guarantee: FDIC standard loss-sharing protocol: Guarantee is in place for 10 years
for residential assets, 5 years for non-residential assets.

Deductible: Institution absorbs all losses in portfolio up to $29 bn (in addition to
existing reserves)

Any losses in portfolio in excess of that amount are shared USG (90%)
and institution (10%).

USG share will be allocated as follows:
UST (via TARP) second loss up to $5 bn;
FDIC takes the third loss up to $10 bn;

Financing: Federal Reserve funds remaining pool of assets with a non-recourse loan,
subject to the institution’s 10% loss sharing, at a floating rate of OIS plus
300bp. Interest payments are with recourse to the institution.

Fee for Guarantee -
Preferred Stock:
Institution will issue $7 bn of preferred stock with an 8% dividend rate
(under terms described below). $4 bn of preferred will be issued to UST.
$3 bn will be issued to the FDIC.

Management of
Assets
: USG will provide institution with a template to manage guaranteed assets
This template will include the use of mortgage modification procedures
adopted by the FDIC, unless otherwise agreed.

Risk Weighting: Institution will retain the income stream from the guaranteed assets. Risk
weighting for assets will be 20%.

Dividends: Institution is prohibited from paying common stock dividends, in excess
of $.01 per share per quarter, for 3 years without UST/FDIC/FRB consent.
A factor taken into account for consideration of the USG’s consent is the
ability to complete a common stock offering of appropriate size.

Executive
Compensation
: An executive compensation plan, including bonuses, that rewards long-
term performance and profitability, with appropriate limitations, must be
submitted to, and approved by, the USG

Corporate
Governance
: Other matters as specified


Preferred Securities 

Issuer: Citigroup (“Citi”)

Initial Holder: United States Department of the Treasury (“UST”).

Size: $20 billion

Security: Preferred, liquidation preference $1,000 per share. (Depending upon the
available authorized preferred shares, the UST may agree to purchase
preferred with a higher liquidation preference per share, in which case the
UST may require Citi to appoint a depositary to hold the Preferred and
issue depositary receipts.)

Ranking: Same terms as preferred issued in CPP.

Term: Perpetual life.

Dividend: The Preferred will pay cumulative dividends at a rate of 8% per annum.
Dividends will be payable quarterly in arrears on February 15, May 15,
August 15 and November 15 of each year.

Redemption: In stock or cash, as mutually agreed between UST and Citi. Otherwise,
redemption terms of CPP preferred terms apply.

Restrictions
on Dividends
: Institution is prohibited from paying common stock dividends, in excess
of $.01 per share per quarter, for 3 years without UST consent. A factor
taken into account for consideration of the UST’s consent is the ability to
complete a common stock offering of appropriate size.

Repurchases: Same terms as preferred issued in CPP.

Voting rights: The Preferred shall be non-voting, other than class voting rights on (i) any
authorization or issuance of shares ranking senior to the Preferred, (ii) any
amendment to the rights of Preferred, or (iii) any merger, exchange or
similar transaction which would adversely affect the rights of the
Preferred.

If dividends on the Preferred are not paid in full for six dividend periods,
whether or not consecutive, the Preferred will have the right to elect 2
directors. The right to elect directors will end when full dividends have
been paid for (i) all prior dividend periods in the case of cumulative
Preferred or (ii) four consecutive dividend periods in the case of non-
cumulative Preferred.

Transferability: The Preferred will not be subject to any contractual restrictions on
transfer.

Executive
Compensation
: An executive compensation plan, including bonuses, that rewards long-
term performance and profitability, with appropriate limitations, must be
submitted to, and approved by, the USG.


Summary of Warrant Terms 

Warrant: Institution will issue a warrant to UST for an aggregate exercise value of
10% of the total preferred issued to USG (in both transactions) ($2.7 bn).

Exercise Price: The strike price will be equal to $10.61 per share (the 20 day trailing
average ending on November 21, 2008). The warrants issued to UST are
not subject to reduction based on additional offerings.

Term: Ten years, immediately exercisable, in whole or in part. 

Friday, 21 November 2008

I bond italiani fanno sempre più paura


"Italian bond yields rose to 110 basis points against German bunds yesterday while those of Greece jumped to 149bp - up by around 20bp this week - on benchmark 10-year securities. This compares with spreads of 65bp for Italy and 73bp for Greece at the height of the Bear Stearns crisis in March".

FT.com

È finita l'epoca dei bulli