Thursday 11 June 2009

Remunerazione degli amministratori esecutivi

Il dibattito sulle remunerazioni degli esecutivi è sempre più incandescente.

Tim Geithner in un recente intervento ha posto l'accento sulla necessità di arginare gli eccessi e ha proposto in tal senso che i comitati remunerazione siano composti unicamente da amministratori indipendenti, a cui sia concessa la facoltà di avvalersi di esperti esterni - a spese della società - per valutare i termini delle remunerazioni agli esecutivi.

La proposta è certamente condivisibile e dovrebbe essere presa in considerazione da Borsa Italiana nella prossima edizione del Codice di Autodisciplina.

Attualmente il Codice di Autodisciplina dispone che il comitato remunerazione sia composto da non esecutivi, la maggioranza dei quali sia indipendente.

Mentre, per il futuro, dovrebbe essere previsto che il comitato sia composto unicamente da indipendenti, con possibilità per il comitato stesso di farsi assistere da esperti del settore al fine di verificare se la remunerazione degli esecutivi sia eccessiva o meno.

Wednesday 10 June 2009

La proposta Schumer sulla corporate governance: un placebo?

Alcuni giorni orsono il Sen Schumer (NY) ha presentato lo Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009 che, inter alia, prevede:(1) l'eliminazione dei staggered boards per le quotate, (2) l'obbligo di sottoppore al voto assembleare (non vincolante) le remunerazioni degli esecutivi e i golden parachutes, (3) l'attribuzione della presidenza del cda a un indipendente nelle quotate; (4) la costituzione obbligatoria di un comitato rischi in seno al cda composto unicamente da indipendenti which shall be responsible for the establishment and evaluation of the risk management practices of the issuer».

La presenza di un comitato rischi sembra però essere un mero placebo, come nota giustamente il Prof. Steven Davidoff, il quale rileva: «The Schumer bill seems to assume that independent directors with less familiarity than management can understand the risks associated with a company. It also assumes that every company, including a Tootsie Pop factory as well as a sophisticated financial institution, requires a risk committee.
Yet in many cases, management is not certain of the risk associated with their operations. How do we expect a part-time board to understand and manage this risk? Is this really necessary, or is it a form of false comfort and insurance?».

Monday 27 April 2009

German banks loaded with 816 billion in toxic paper

On Friday, the German daily Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) leaked a bombshell - a confidential report by Bafin, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, found that German banks were sitting on over 800 billion euros in toxic assets. Just three months ago, the reports coming out suggested the problem was only half as large, 400 billion euros.

This new account has been all over the news in Germany because Germans are becoming quite frightened about the health of their banking system and are angry because the German economy was largely absent from the bubbles of the past decade. Germans are beginning to ask quite openly why banks like Commerzbank and the state-owned land banks as well as institutions like Hypo Real Estate are being rescued with taxpayer money. This is a debate now ongoing in a number of countries, the U.S., the U.K. and Ireland most prominent among them. In an election year in Germany, this issue is sure to have an impact.

Credit Writedowns


Money for Nothing


On July 15, 2007, The New York Times published an article with the headline “The Richest of the Rich, Proud of a New Gilded Age.” The most prominently featured of the “new titans” was Sanford Weill, the former chairman of Citigroup, who insisted that he and his peers in the financial sector had earned their immense wealth through their contributions to society.

Soon after that article was printed, the financial edifice Mr. Weill took credit for helping to build collapsed, inflicting immense collateral damage in the process. Even if we manage to avoid a repeat of the Great Depression, the world economy will take years to recover from this crisis.

All of which explains why we should be disturbed by an article in Sunday’s Times reporting that pay at investment banks, after dipping last year, is soaring again — right back up to 2007 levels.

Why is this disturbing? Let me count the ways.

First, there’s no longer any reason to believe that the wizards of Wall Street actually contribute anything positive to society, let alone enough to justify those humongous paychecks.

Remember that the gilded Wall Street of 2007 was a fairly new phenomenon. From the 1930s until around 1980 banking was a staid, rather boring business that paid no better, on average, than other industries, yet kept the economy’s wheels turning.

So why did some bankers suddenly begin making vast fortunes? It was, we were told, a reward for their creativity — for financial innovation. At this point, however, it’s hard to think of any major recent financial innovations that actually aided society, as opposed to being new, improved ways to blow bubbles, evade regulations and implement de facto Ponzi schemes.

Consider a recent speech by Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, in which he tried to defend financial innovation. His examples of “good” financial innovations were (1) credit cards — not exactly a new idea; (2) overdraft protection; and (3) subprime mortgages. (I am not making this up.) These were the things for which bankers got paid the big bucks?

Still, you might argue that we have a free-market economy, and it’s up to the private sector to decide how much its employees are worth. But this brings me to my second point: Wall Street is no longer, in any real sense, part of the private sector. It’s a ward of the state, every bit as dependent on government aid as recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, a k a “welfare.”

I’m not just talking about the $600 billion or so already committed under the TARP. There are also the huge credit lines extended by the Federal Reserve; large-scale lending by Federal Home Loan Banks; the taxpayer-financed payoffs of A.I.G. contracts; the vast expansion of F.D.I.C. guarantees; and, more broadly, the implicit backing provided to every financial firm considered too big, or too strategic, to fail.

One can argue that it’s necessary to rescue Wall Street to protect the economy as a whole — and in fact I agree. But given all that taxpayer money on the line, financial firms should be acting like public utilities, not returning to the practices and paychecks of 2007.

Furthermore, paying vast sums to wheeler-dealers isn’t just outrageous; it’s dangerous. Why, after all, did bankers take such huge risks? Because success — or even the temporary appearance of success — offered such gigantic rewards: even executives who blew up their companies could and did walk away with hundreds of millions. Now we’re seeing similar rewards offered to people who can play their risky games with federal backing.

So what’s going on here? Why are paychecks heading for the stratosphere again? Claims that firms have to pay these salaries to retain their best people aren’t plausible: with employment in the financial sector plunging, where are those people going to go?

No, the real reason financial firms are paying big again is simply because they can. They’re making money again (although not as much as they claim), and why not? After all, they can borrow cheaply, thanks to all those federal guarantees, and lend at much higher rates. So it’s eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow you may be regulated.

Or maybe not. There’s a palpable sense in the financial press that the storm has passed: stocks are up, the economy’s nose-dive may be leveling off, and the Obama administration will probably let the bankers off with nothing more than a few stern speeches. Rightly or wrongly, the bankers seem to believe that a return to business as usual is just around the corner.

We can only hope that our leaders prove them wrong, and carry through with real reform. In 2008, overpaid bankers taking big risks with other people’s money brought the world economy to its knees. The last thing we need is to give them a chance to do it all over again.

NYT

Le svalutazioni dei toxic assets: a che punto siamo secondo l'IMF



Fonte: IMF

Friday 20 March 2009

The Turner Review: a regulatory response to the global banking crisis

Following the banking crisis, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Lord Turner, in his capacity as our Chairman, to review and make recommendations for reforming UK and international approaches to the way banks are regulated.

The Turner Review

Tuesday 24 February 2009

500 miliardi per RBS e Lloyd TBS

Taxpayers may become liable for £500bn of poor loans and investments made by Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TSB.
Negotiations are at an advanced stage on what the Treasury has called its Asset Protection Scheme, which would involve taxpayers insuring banks against future losses on their less prudent lending and investment.
It is understood that each of Lloyds and Royal Bank hope to insure £250bn of their loans and investments.

They are working towards a deadline of Thursday for Royal Bank and Friday for Lloyds to agree the outline of the deal with the Treasury.

If £500bn of their assets are insured, this would be a bold attempt by the Treasury to achieve two outcomes: first, to strengthen their balance sheets to avoid having to nationalise the banks fully if their losses increase: second, to release resources within the banks to generate perhaps £30bn or £40bn of new lending to companies and homebuyers.
It would also, however, lift the total of British taxpayer support for our banks since the start of the credit crunch - in the form of loans, guarantees, insurance and investment - to a remarkable £1.3 trillion, more-or-less equivalent to the entire annual output of the British economy or GDP.

Sources close to the negotiations said there are still important disagreements between the Treasury and the banks on the terms of the deal.

One contentious area is the size of the loss - known as the first loss - that the banks must incur before taxpayers pick up the tab.

The Treasury wanted the banks' owners, their shareholders, to be liable for the first 10 per cent of the loss.

But on £500bn of assets, that 10 per cent loss would potentially destroy their balance sheets - and thus end up weakening the banks, rather than strengthening them.

Second, is the size of the fee payable by the banks.

This would be in the form of participating preference shares to be issued to the Treasury and would probably be classed under banking regulations as core tier one capital - which means they would reinforce the financial robustness of the banks.

These shares would carry no votes. So the Government's voting control of Royal Bank would remain at 70 per cent and 43 per cent for Lloyds TSB.

But if the fee were set high, the Government's economic interest in these banks - it claims over the banks' assets - could approach 100 per cent.

In the sense of rights over the banks' profits and assets, there would be little or nothing left for Royal Bank's and Lloyds' private sector shareholders. This would represent "economic" nationalisation of the banks, if not formal nationalisation.

The banks and Treasury officials, together with teams of City advisers, are struggling to construct a formula that avoids this economic nationalisation.

Lo Schleswig-Holstein e la città di Amburgo lanciano un salvagente a HSH Nordbank

Two German federal states on Tuesday agreed a €13bn ($16.6bn) bail-out of HSH Nordbank, the shipping financier, whose losses on complex structured financial products have crippled the regional lender and blown a hole in government finances.

Government leaders from Schleswig-Holstein and the city state of Hamburg met in Kiel to thrash out a rescue package which was comprised of a €3bn capital injection and €10bn in guarantees to cover future losses.

The deal was put together after Germany’s financial regulator had threatened to shut the bank down unless it raised capital, but must still be approved by both state parliaments.

Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg together own around 60 per cent of HSH, while a further 26 per cent is controlled by JC Flowers, the US investor.

HSH said the injection will raise the bank’s Tier 1 capital from around 7 per cent to almost 9 per cent. The bank also said it planned to reduce the size of its balance sheet by half to around €100bn in the coming years.

“This is good news for the region, the bank, our staff and our clients,” said Dirk Jens Nonnenmacher, HSH chief executive of HSH.

Rasmus Vöge, the regional deputy head of chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union party, told a newspaper on Tuesday that Schleswig-Holstein was “quasi-bankrupt” as a result of HSH’s losses.

The sentiment was echoed by Wolfgang Kubicki, state head of the Free Democratic party, who warned that without federal assistance Schleswig-Holstein faced “political bankruptcy like Iceland”.

Mr Kubicki told Reuters that HSH would require around up to €9bn in capital over the next four to five years.

Although it is constitutionally impossible for a federal state to declare bankruptcy, the comments underscore the depth of the financial calamity that has befallen the region.

HSH posted a €2.8bn loss last year and was forced to secure €30bn in lending guarantees from Soffin, the federal government’s stabilisation fund. Soffin declined to provide further assistance until the bank met certain conditions.

Around one-quarter of HSH’s 4,000 employees are set to lose their jobs as a result of a restructuring plan that will see the bank cut non-core operations and focus more on its clients in northern Germany.

Ribassi storici del mercato finanziario

Banche fallite negli USA ad oggi

2008 and 2009 Bank and Thrift Failures ($Mil)


Date
Failed Institution
City
State
Regulator
Total Assets
FDIC Insurance Fund's Estimated Loss
Acquired By
Uninsured Deposits not Acquired
Dividends on Uninsured Deposits
02/13/09

Sherman County Bank

Loup City
Neb.
State
$130
$28
Heritage Bank of Wood River, Neb.
$0.0
N/A
02/13/09

Riverside Bank of the Gulf Coast

Cape Coral
Fla.
State
$539
$201.5
TIB Financial Corp (TIBB) of Naples, Fla.
$0.0
N/A
02/13/09

Corn Belt Bank and Trust

Pittsfield
Ill.
State
$272
$100
Carlinville National Bank, Carlinville, Ill.
$0.0
N/A
02/13/09 Pinnacle Bank
Beaverton
Ore.
State
$73
$12.1
Washington Trust Bank, Spokane, Wash.
$0.0
N/A
02/06/09 County Bank
Merced
Calif.
State
$1,700
$135
Westamerica Bancorporation (WABC)
$0.0
N/A
02/06/09 Alliance Bank
Culver City
Calif.
State
$1,140
$206
California Bank & Trust, held by Zions Bancorporation (ZION).
$0.0
N/A
02/06/09 FirstBank Financial Services
McDonough
Ga.
State
$337
$111
Regions Financial (RF)
$0.0
N/A
01/30/09 Ocala National Bank
Ocala
Fla.
OCC
$224
$100
CenterState Banks of Florida (CSFL)
$0.0
N/A
01/30/09 Suburban FSB
Crofton
Md.
OTS
$360
$126
Bank of Essex, Tappahannock, Va.
$0.0
N/A
01/30/09 Magnet Bank
Salt Lake City
Utah
State
$293
$119
No Acquirer.
$0.0
N/A
01/23/09 1st Centennial Bank
Redlands
Calif.
State
$803
$227
First Califorina Financial Group (FCAL), Camarillo, Calif.
$12.8
0%
01/16/09 Bank of Clark County
Vancouver
Wash.
State
$447
$120 to $145
Umpqua Holdings Corp. (UMPQ), Roseburg, Ore.
$39.3
0%
01/16/09 National Bank of Commerce
Berkely
Ill.
OCC
$431
$97
Republic Bank of Chicago, Oak Brook, Ill.
$0.0
N/A
12/12/08 Sanderson State Bank
Sanderson
Texas
State
$37
$13
The Pecos County State Bank, Fort Stockton, Texas
$0.0
N/A
12/12/08 Haven Trust Bank
Duluth
Ga.
State
$572
$200
BB&T Corp. (BBT)
$0.0
N/A
12/05/08 First Georgia Community Bank
Jackson
Ga.
State
$238
$72
United Bank, Zebulon, Ga.
$0.0
N/A
11/21/08 PFF Bank & Trust
Pomona
Calif.
OTS
$3,700
$700
U.S. Bancorp (USB)
$0.0
N/A
11/21/08 Downey Savings & Loan, FA
Newport Beach
Calif.
OTS
$12,800
$1,400
U.S. Bancorp (USB)
$0.0
N/A
11/21/08 The Community Bank
Loganville
Ga.
State
$681
$200 to $240
Bank of Essex, Tappahannock, Va.
$0.0
N/A
11/07/08 Security Pacific Bank
Los Angeles
Calif.
State
$561
$208
Pacific Western Bank, San Diego, Calif., held by PacWest Bancorp (PACW).
$0.0
N/A
11/07/08 Franklin Bank, SSB
Houston
Texas
State
$5,100
$1,479
Prosperity Bancshares (PRSP), Houston, Texas
$0.0
N/A
10/31/08 Freedom Bank
Bradenton
Fla.
State
$287
$92
Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB)
$0.0
N/A
10/24/08 Alpha B&T
Alpharetta
Ga.
State
$354
$158
Stearns Bank, NA, St. Cloud, Minn.
$0.4
0%
10/10/08 Meridian Bank
Eldred
Ill.
State
$39
$9
National Bank, Hillsboro, Ill.
$0.0
N/A
10/10/08 Main Street Bank
Northville
Mich.
State
$98
$36
Monroe Bank & Trust, Monroe, Mich.
$0.0
N/A
09/25/08 Washington Mutual Bank
Seattle
Wash.
OTS
$307,000
$0
JPMorgan Chase (JPM)
$0.0
N/A
09/19/08 Ameribank, Inc.
Northfork
W.Va.
OTS
$115
$42
Pioneer Community Bank, Iaeger, W. Va., and The Citizens SB, Martins Ferry, Ohio.
$0.0
N/A
09/05/08 Silver State Bank
Henderson
Nev.
State
$1,957
$505
Nevada State Bank, Las Vegas, held by Zions Bancorporation (ZION).
$26.1
0%
08/29/08 Integrity Bank
Alpharetta
Ga.
State
$1,107
$295
Regions Financial (RF)
$0.0
N/A
08/22/08 The Columbian B&TC
Topeka
Kan.
State
$752
$62
Citizens B&T, Chillicothe, Mo,
$28.2
0%
08/01/08 First Priority Bank
Bradenton
Fla.
State
$259
$72
SunTrust Banks, Inc. (STI)
$2.1
50%
07/25/08 First Heritgage Bank, NA
Newport Beach
Calif.
OCC
$254
$42
Mutual of Omaha Bank, Omaha, Neb.
$0.0
N/A
07/25/08 First NB of Nevada
Reno
Nev.
OCC
$3,411
$820
Mutual of Omaha Bank, Omaha, Neb.
$0.0
N/A
07/11/08 IndyMac Bank, FSB
Pasadena
Calif.
OTS
$30,699
$8,900
FDIC conservatorship, since sold to consortium led by J.C. Flowers & Co.
$539.6
50%
05/30/08 First Integrity Bank, NA
Staples
Minn.
OCC
$55
$2
First International B&T, Watford City, N.D.
$0.0
N/A
05/09/08 ANB Financial, NA
Bentonville
Ark.
OCC
$2,100
$214
Pulaski B&TC, Little Rock, Ark., held by IberiaBank Corp. (IBKC).
$10.4
12%
03/07/08 Hume Bank
Hume
Mo.
State
$19
$3
Security Bank, Rich Hill, Mo.
$0.4
63%
01/25/08 Douglass National Bank
Kansas City
Mo.
OCC
$59
$6
Liberty B&TC, New Orleans, La.
$0.0
N/A


Friday 20 February 2009

La situazione in centro ed est Europa

Europe’s top banks are bracing for a tough year as concerns grow over the worsening economic situation, especially in eastern and central Europe.

It seems investors are adjusting their ideas about Eastern Europe from a hot growth story to toxic investment -- as countries from Latvia to Bulgaria face potential economic collapse.

And Western banks that went into this market hoping to make a killing – may instead become dead meat, themselves.

According to Reuters, UniCredit (CRDI.MI), Erste Group Bank (ERST.VI), Raiffeisen International (RIBH.VI) and Societe Generale (SOGN.PA) are the biggest Western banks in Eastern Europe. They bought most of emerging Europe's banking sector in past years to tap into the rampant credit growth that fueled the region's boom.

However, since that time the local currencies have fallen in value. (Remember many of the nations in Eastern Europe are not on the euro and many countries in Eastern Europe have racked up massive amounts of debt.)

The fear is rapidly falling currencies could weigh down these banks' profitability and potentially erode their capital base – as loans are repaid in currencies that are worth less and less.

Should you take a short position in any of these currencies? According to Traxis Partners managing partner Barton Biggs probably not.

He tells Fast Money, “I would be very nervous about being short the core Eastern European currencies particularly Poland’s currency."

"And I would be nervous about being short the euro. The euro has already fallen on concerns that its finished and I don’t think that’s the case.”

In fact if you have short positions Biggs says to cover them.

Tuesday 17 February 2009

Le preoccupazioni di Moody's

The banking system in eastern Europe is increasingly vulnerable to a severe economic downturn, Moody’s has warned, saying western European banks with local subsidiaries are at risk of ratings downgrades.

The relative vulnerabilties in east European banking systems will be exposed by an increasingly tougher operating environment in eastern Europe as a result of a steep and long economic downturn coupled with macroeconomic vulnerabilities,” Moody’s said in a report.

The ratings agency said it expected “continuous downward pressure on east European bank ratings” because of deteriorating asset quality, falling local currencies, exposure to a regional slump in real-estate and the units’ reliance on scarce short-term funding.

Eurozone banks have the largest exposure to central and eastern Europe, with liabilities of $1,500bn – about 90 per cent of total foreign bank exposure to the region.

Shares of the handful of banks with substantial investments in eastern Europe – led by Austria’s Raiffeisen and Erste Bank, Société Générale of France, Italy’s UniCredit (which owns Bank Austria) and Belgian group KBC – tumbled after the ratings agency said it was concerned about the impact of a slowdown and the ability of the parent banks to support their support units in the region.

The Austrian banking system is the most vulnerable, with eastern Europe accounting for nearly half of its foreign loans, while Italian banks are exposed to Poland and Croatia and Scandinavian institutions to the Baltic states.

Central and eastern European currencies have come under intense pressure in recent weeks. The credit crisis has raised fears over the region’s ability to finance its current account deficits and slowing global growth has heightened concerns over the health of its export-dependent economies.

The Polish zloty plunged to a five-year low against the euro on Tuesday, while the Czech koruna hit a three-year trough against the single currency and the Hungarian forint falling to a record low.

The Prague and Warsaw stock indices meanwhile fell to their lowest levels in five years, while the smaller markets of Budapest, Zagreb and Bucharest skirted close to multi-year lows.

The euro dropped to a two-month low against the dollar on Tuesday on heightened concerns over eurozone banks’ exposure to the worsening conditions in eastern Europe.

Amid the growing sense of crisis in eastern European economies, Hungary on Tuesday outlined plans to save Ft210bn (€680m, $860m) this year to prevent an increase in the budget deficit. Hungary’s economy is expected to contract by up to 3 per cent this year, much more than earlier expectations.

Antje Praefcke at Commerzbank said eastern European currencies were in a “self-feeding depreciation spiral.”

“The creditworthiness of local banks, companies and private households, who hold mainly foreign currency denominated debt, is deteriorating with each depreciation in eastern European currencies, thus further undermining confidence in the currencies,” she said.

Ms Praefcke said further depreciation of eastern European currencies was thus a distinct possibility, which was likely to undermine the euro.

“The collapse of these currencies is likely to constitute a risk for the euro,” she said. “So far markets have largely ignored this fact, but are unlikely to be able to maintain this approach if the weakness of the eastern European currencies continues.”

Western European banks have piled into the former Communist countries in recent years as economic growth in the region outpaced domestic gains. The accession of 10 new members to the European Union in 2004, and of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, added to optimism about the region. In 2007, Raiffeisen and Erste Bank earned the vast majority of their pre-tax profits in eastern European countries including Russia and Ukraine.

Since the onset of the global financial crisis, Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine have all received emergency loans from the International Monetary Fund, with other countries in the region expected to follow.

FT.com

Titoli di Stato: la forbice si allarga

Disparities in the European government bond market increased to the most in at least 10 years after Moody’s Investors Service said it may downgrade some banks with units in Eastern Europe.

The difference between what Germany and Austria pay to borrow for 10 years widened to a record, while the gap between Greek and German 10-year yields increased to the most in a decade. Lenders from Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, Germany and Sweden account for 84 percent of western European bank loans in eastern Europe, Moody’s said.

East European banks, which are mainly subsidiaries of financial institutions such as Austria’s Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG, Italy’s UniCredit SpA and Paris-based Societe Generale SA, are likely to come under “downward pressure” which may also weaken their parent companies, Moody’s wrote in a report today in London.

The difference in yield, or spread, between the 10-year German bund, Europe’s benchmark government security, and the equivalent Austrian security was 129 basis points by 9 a.m. in London, from 120 basis points yesterday and 88 basis points a week ago. The average in the past 10 years is 15 basis points.

The difference in yield between 10-year Italian and German bunds widened to 163 basis points, from 155 basis points yesterday and 119 basis points a week ago.

Bloomberg.com

Quale futuro per l'Europa dell'Est (e per Unicredit)?

«We've commented from time to time that a possible financial flashpoint is countries that got themselves in the same fix as Iceland , of having a banking sector engaged in the generally risky practices that were standard form recently, and was outsized relative to the economy (Willem Buiter also points out that that precarious situation is made worse by having your own teeny currency).

While Ireland is in that position, a more immediate trigger for trouble is Eastern Europe. 

We've mentioned in particular the precarious position of Austria, which was a big lender to the region. As Ambrose Evans-Pritchard remarks in the Telegraph:

Austria's finance minister Josef Pröll made frantic efforts last week to put together a €150bn rescue for the ex-Soviet bloc. Well he might. His banks have lent €230bn to the region, equal to 70pc of Austria's GDP.

"A failure rate of 10pc would lead to the collapse of the Austrian financial sector," reported Der Standard in Vienna. Unfortunately, that is about to happen.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) says bad debts will top 10pc and may reach 20pc. The Vienna press said Bank Austria and its Italian owner Unicredit face a "monetary Stalingrad" in the East.

Mr Pröll tried to drum up support for his rescue package from EU finance ministers in Brussels last week. The idea was scotched by Germany's Peer Steinbrück. Not our problem, he said.....

Yves here. Recall we said a few days ago (based on admittedly a small number of conversations, but the Austrian and German businessmen were knowledgeable) that the Austrian banks were widely known to be bankrupt, that Austrians knew they needed to be rescued and would need help. The Austrians were highly confident that Germany would fund a bailout, and the Germans were mystified that the Austrians were so certain. The Germans' doubts appear to have been well founded. Back to the piece:
Stephen Jen, currency chief at Morgan Stanley, said Eastern Europe has borrowed $1.7 trillion abroad, much on short-term maturities. It must repay – or roll over – $400bn this year, equal to a third of the region's GDP. Good luck. The credit window has slammed shut....

"This is the largest run on a currency in history," said Mr Jen.

In Poland, 60pc of mortgages are in Swiss francs. The zloty has just halved against the franc. Hungary, the Balkans, the Baltics, and Ukraine are all suffering variants of this story. As an act of collective folly – by lenders and borrowers – it matches America's sub-prime debacle. There is a crucial difference, however. European banks are on the hook for both. US banks are not.

Almost all East bloc debts are owed to West Europe, especially Austrian, Swedish, Greek, Italian, and Belgian banks. En plus, Europeans account for an astonishing 74pc of the entire $4.9 trillion portfolio of loans to emerging markets....

Whether it takes months, or just weeks, the world is going to discover that Europe's financial system is sunk, and that there is no EU Federal Reserve yet ready to act as a lender of last resort or to flood the markets with emergency stimulus....

Erik Berglof, EBRD's chief economist, told me the region may need €400bn in help to cover loans and prop up the credit system....

The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, w...We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights.

Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country – facing a 12pc contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices – is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn. Latvia's central bank governor has declared his economy "clinically dead" after it shrank 10.5pc in the fourth quarter...

"This is much worse than the East Asia crisis in the 1990s," said Lars Christensen, at Danske Bank.

This is looking ugly indeed, and that's before you consider that European banks are on average much more leveraged than their US counterparts».

Lloyds TBS / HBOS

L'amaro post di Robert Peston sul drammatico stato di salute della superbanca.

The 10 people most responsible for the recession

Fuld_414200a


1. Dick Fuld


Multi-billionaire and US squash all-star Dick Fuld, 62, was CEO of Lehman Brothers when it went bust in September last year. Dubbed the “scariest man on Wall Street”, Dick Fuld is blamed for a litany of mistakes that include leaving Lehman Brothers heavily exposed to toxic US sub-prime mortgage debt and other assets that collapsed in value in the wake of the credit crunch.

His secretive work ethic, which rewarded loyalty over all else, has been criticised for silencing potential whistleblowers. In its final months a series of interested buyers surfaced to save Lehmans, but Mr Fuld would not sell at the prices offered. Had he acted sooner, he would have been able to avoid bankruptcy. Institutional Investor magazine named Dick “America’s top chief executive” in 2006. The collapse of Lehmans triggered the second destructive phase in the credit crunch and laid the foundations for a full blown global recession.

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2. Hank Paulson

If Dick Fuld is responsible for the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Henry Paulson, the former US Treasury Secretary, is the man who let it happen. Anatole Kaletsky, of The Times, says: “The global banking collapse could perhaps be described as a bullet in the head, since its proximate cause was a conscious decision by the US Treasury to jeopardise the stability of the world economy in pursuit of an essentially political objective - to show that the Bush Administration was willing to act ruthlessly against at least one big Wall Street investment bank. Until that point, savers and investors around the world had assumed that financial institutions such as Lehman were “too big to fail” and would always be supported by their governments. By shattering this belief Henry Paulson triggered a run on every important bank in the world and caused the sudden implosion of consumer and business confidence seen in the past two months.”

Hank didn’t just let Lehmans fail. He made a series of mistakes in the run up to the Lehmans collapse. He also proposed a £700 billion package to boost the US banking system. And how did Hank come up with a figure of £700 billion? “It’s not based on any particular data point,” a Treasury spokeswoman told Forbes.com, the US financial website. “We just wanted to choose a really large number.”

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3. Alan Greenspan

Alan Greenspan was feted for his management of the US economy while he stood in charge of the US Treasury, but has since been put under the spotlight. He was responsible for cutting interest rates to near zero in the US in the aftermath of September 11, flooding the world with cheap and easily available money. Did this pave the way for a “once-in-a-century credit tsunami"? In October last year he said: “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders.” 

Allan Meltzer is a professor of political economy at the Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, said: “Alan Greenspan was much too afraid of a slowdown or other recession…he allowed the credit to expand too rapidly."

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4. John Tiner/Hector Sants

John Tiner was in charge of the Financial Services Authority, the watchdog that polices the UK ’s complex financial services industry until 2007, when it was taken over by Hector Sants. The FSA failed to keep a close eye on Northern Rock, the Newcastle-based ex-mutual which gorged on wholesale mortgage securitisation and came a cropper as a result. A key parliamentary committee has said that the FSA was guilty of a "systematic failure". Mr Sants accepted that the organisation under Mr Tiner failed to stress-test the business model of Northern Rock and spot signs that the bank was dangerously dependent on interbank funding to remain in business. "We should have been in more intense dialogue earlier", he has said. 


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5. Fred “the shred” Goodwin

The "world's worst banker" has brought the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Britain's second biggest bank, to its knees. Last week it announced humiliating losses of £28 billion, the biggest in British corporate history, and economists and analysts have concluded that it could soon be fully-nationalised. In mid-January, taxpayers saw their stake in the banking giant increase from 58 per cent to 70 per cent.

Sir Fred joined RBS in 2000 and promptly embarked on a spending spree, acquiring 26 banks in seven years for more than £35 billion. These included NatWest and stakes in America and the Bank of China. In 2006, its share price stood at £13. But at the close of trading on January 28, RBS shares were trading at a near-worthless 15.9p.  

In 2000, after the takeover of NatWest, RBS’s board rewarded Sir with a £2.1 million annual salary, including a bonus of £814,000 for the takeover — more than any other UK bank chief received that year. It paled in comparison with his £2.86 million bonus in 2007. Three months ago, in October, Sir Fred left the bank under a dark cloud that has now mushroomed into a thunderstorm. On the day his departure was announced, Sir Fred said he was "sad", adding: "Nobody will ever tell you that they feel good the day they have to step down.” The Prince's Trust recently dumped Fred The Shred and the campaign to strip him of his knighthood is gathering pace.

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6. Gordon Brown

Apparently Gordon Brown predicted the global financial crisis ten years ago, in a speech he made to Harvard students. Sadly he did little to prevent it. James Gordon Brown was Chancellor of the Exchequer during “the longest period of growth” in the UK ’s history, but economists blame Mr Brown for encouraging soaring house price inflation and the spread of credit which fuelled the years of boom and led eventually to the current bust.

In a recent speech to the London School of Economics, George Osbourne, the Shadow Chancellor, said: "Our competitors used the fat years to prepare for the lean years. Britain did not. We are the least prepared country in the developed world to cope with the current financial turbulence. Our financial reputation has been badly damaged by the only run on a retail bank in the world. Our double deficits - external and fiscal - are worse than any other European economy. Taken together, they are worse than the United States." The blame "lies squarely and fairly with Gordon Brown", he concluded.

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7. George Bush

The former President was in charge during the boom years when the seeds of the sub-prime implosion were sown, but has failed to take any responsibility for the financial disaster which occurred on his watch. In a speech last year he blamed the bankers in New York for the problems facing his country's economy. “Wall Street got drunk…The question is, how long will it [take to] sober up and not try to do all these fancy financial instruments?” 

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8. Kathleen Corbet

The credit rating agencies have been blamed for failing to ask tough questions about the collateralised debt products containing so many toxic sub-prime mortgages, which investors traded for millions of dollars during the booming housing years. The three biggest agencies have been accused of taking the word of investors and not properly assessing the risks involved in securitisation. Mrs Corbet was head of the biggest credit rating agency, Standard & Poors, before she quit amidst heavy criticism in 2007. Critics argue that S&P and its main rival Moody's, as well as other agencies, face an inherent conflict of interest, in that many of their clients issue securities that are rated by its analysts.


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9. "Hank" Greenberg

Another Hank. This one was head of AIG, the insurance giant that had to be rescued in an £47 billion US government bailout just days after Lehman Brothers was allowed to go bust. Hank was in charge between 1967 until 2005, during which time the insurer got heavily involved in the murky world of credit default swaps. Mr Greenberg appealed to the US Government to save the company last September, saying: "It's a healthy company financially except for liquidity. No organisation around the world has the spread of risk that AIG does. It's a company that opens markets - letting it go down would be a dramatic mistake."

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10. Angelo Mozilo

Mr Mozilo was head of the largest sub-prime mortgage lender in the US, Countrywide, until July 2008. Sub-prime lenders in the US have been accused of using misleading marketing to push unsuitable mortgages on sub-prime homeowners who could not afford to service the debt, the root cause of the credit crunch. During the housing boom, Mr Mozilo reportedly earned $470 million in salary and other income. Mr Mozilo has also been under the spotlight for a VIP programme in which politicians and senior officials in the Government were offered favourable mortgage deals. Earlier this month Bank of America agreed to buy Countrywide for about $4 billion (£2 billion). Meanwhile, Mozilo unloaded $141m in stock options before the company's share price collapsed.

Money Central (votate per il sondaggio)

Thursday 12 February 2009

S&P 500: giugno 2008 - gennaio 2009



1 6/3 Obama Clinches Nomination.
2 6/7 Markets Slammed by Oil, Crude Leaps Nearly $11.
3 6/10 Big Loss At Lehman Intensifies Crisis Jitters.
4 6/11 Inflation’s Bite Worsens Around World.
5 6/21 Ford Reels as Truck Sales Plunge.
6 6/28 Dow Hits Bear-Market Territory.
7 7/12 Crisis Deepens as Big Bank Fails: IndyMac Seized In Largest Bust In Two Decades.
8 7/14 Treasury and Fed Pledge Aid For Ailing Mortgage Giants.
9 7/16 SEC Moves to Curb Short Selling.
10 8/11 Russia Widens Attacks on Georgia.
11 9/8 US Seizes Mortgage Giants FNM and FRE.
12 9/15 Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill Is Sold, AIG Seeks to Raise Cash.
13 9/17 US To Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up.
14 9/20 US Bailout Plan Calms Markets, But Struggle Looms Over Details.
15 9/22 Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis.
16 9/26 WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to JP Morgan, In Largest Failure in US Banking History.
17 9/30 Bailout Plan Rejected, Markets Plunge, Forcing New Scramble to Solve Crisis.
18 10/4 Historic Bailout Passes As Economy Slips Further.
19 10/14 US to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks.
20 10/23 Markets Fall as Fears of Slump Span World.
21 10/28 Crisis Deals New Blow to Japan: Stocks at ‘82 Levels.
22 11/5 Obama Sweeps to Historic Victory.
23 11/19 Big Three Plead For Aid.
24 11/24 US Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup.
25 12/12 Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud.
26 12/17 Fed Cuts Rates Near Zero to Battle Slump.
27 12/29 Israel Pounds Gaza Again, Signals More on the Way.
28 1/3 Manufacturing Tumbles Globally.
29 1/8 Corporate Scandal Shakes India.
30 1/10 Citigroup Takes First Step Toward Breakup.
31 1/15 Bank of America to Get Billions in US Aid.
32 1/21 President Barack Obama.
33 1/23 Thain Ousted in Clash at Bank of America.


The Big Picture

8 banchieri alla berlina

Ieri sono stati messi alla berlina dallo House Financial Services Committee 8 banchieri di Wall Street circa l'uso dei fondi ottenuti attraverso l'adesione ai TARP

I CEO chiamati a testimoniare: Kenneth D. Lewis - Bank of America; Robert P. Kelly - Bank of New York Mellon; Vikram Pandit - Citigroup; Lloyd C. Blankfein - Goldman SachsJamie Dimon - JPMorgan Chase; John J. Mack - Morgan Stanley; Ronald E. Logue - State Street; e John G. Stumpf - Wells Fargo.

DealBook ha pubblicato il resoconto dell'audizione che riporto qui di seguito.

5:03 p.m. | It’s over: The hearing adjourns.

4:58 p.m. | Lending — a tough job: Representative Dan Maffei, Democrat of New York, asks Mr. Dimon how he his going to get money into the system. Mr. Dimon says all the government programs need to be implemented quickly and on a coordinated basis. He also notes that nonbank financing companies have essentially dropped off lending leaving the banks to make up for that gap, which will be tough to fill.

4:50 p.m. | That other bailout (autos): Asked whether they have received any specific proposals from the auto industry for overhauling its debt. Mr. Lewis says his bank is deep in discussions with the automakers. Asked whether the auto companies should go into bankruptcy, Mr. Dimon says it depends on the terms, but either way his bank will not make money.

4:49 p.m. | We love Michigan, but…: Representative Gary Peters, Democrat of Michigan, asks if his state is being singled out as a place where the banks won’t lend. Mr. Dimon and Mr. Lewis say that they want to make every good loan they can, but that because Michigan has the highest unemployment in the nation, they will likely do less business there.

4:42 p.m. | Rewards for the long term: Representative Jim Himes, Democrat of Connecticut, asks if any of the bankers if they will craft compensation plans that reward people for longterm performance and not for taking huge risks. They all agree to do so.

4:33 p.m. | Lingering questions about A.I.G.: Mr. Blankfein is asked how much money Goldman Sachs received from the rescue of A.I.G. Mr. Blankfein says that his bank was called by the New York Fed to advise it on a private market solution to A.I.G., but that Goldman did not have unhedged exposure to A.I.G.

4:31 p.m. | No daydream believers: Representative Andre Carson, Democrat of Indiana, tells the bankers that “the public doesn’t believe you learned from your errors.”

4:27 p.m. | Survivor (not the TV show): Representative Donald A. Manzullo, Republican of Illinois, asks the bankers whether they would survive if unemployment rose to 11 percent and a 25 percent further decline in real estate prices Mr. Mack says it would be painful, but Morgan Stanley would survive. Mr. Blankfein says Goldman would survive, but “we may be in a downward bubble” since everyone is pessimistic.

4:20 p.m. | “Feed the troops”: Representative Joe Donnelly, Democrat of Indiana, tells the bankers to “feed the troops before they feed themselves.” “We are counting on your good judgment,” he says. He also asks the bankers whether they can work with small businesses who are paying their loans but their ratios might be off. Mr. Stumpf says they are working with small companies.

4:16 p.m. | Mark to market: Mrs. Biggert asks whether anyone would do away with mark-to-market accounting. Mr. Stumpf and Mr. Lewis said it should be modified for extraordinary times when there is no market for products.

4:13 p.m. | “We’re still standing”: Representative Judy Biggert, Republican of Illinois, asks how banks can restore confidence, and Mr. Dimon offers up some patriotic words: “We will beat this thing. We are bruised and battered, but we’re still standing and I believe America will do what it’s always done” and get through the problem.

4:10 p.m. | “Not a bad thing”: Responding to a question of whether some banks are too big, Mr. Mack says Morgan Stanley isn’t too big and he intends to grow, but notes there could be an issue with banks getting into too many businesses. Mr. Dimon says that “large itself is not a bad thing” and notes the United States military is big.

4:05 p.m. | Into the unknown: “The question I and nobody else will know is what would have happened” if the TARP money wasn’t there, Mr. Dimon says.

4:01 p.m. | Solvency? Yes. Nationalization? No!: Responding to a question about bank solvency, Mr. Pandit says Citigroup’s Tier 1 capital ratio is 12 percent, well above what the regulators require, and he believes the bank is very well capitalized. Mr. Lewis says his Tier 1 capital ratio is about 10.6 percent and notes that Bank of America made money last year. Asked about whether Bank of America or Citigroup should be nationalized, both bankers said no.

3:50 p.m. | Seeking commitments: Representative Mary Jo Kilroy, Democrat of Ohio, asks Mr. Lewis if he stands by his commitment that Bank of America will not need additional government funding. Mr. Lewis says stands by the statement. Ms. Kilroy asks the other members whether they can commit to fully paying back the government. Mr. Blankfein says that it is his expectation to pay the government back. Mr. Dimon, Mr. Kelly and everybody else says they also expect to repay the government. Mr. Pandit says he cannot commit to not accepting more capital under a government program because it may be beneficial to his shareholders.

3:42 p.m. | No less anger: A congressman from Texas says the American people won’t have any less anger after the hearing because they don’t know where the money has gone. He asks if the bankers can ascertain the amount of new money that has been lent out directly attributable to TARP. Everybody raises their hands except for Mr. Stumpf, who says all of the loans go into the same pool of capital.

3:30 p.m. | “Mr. Countrywide”: A congessman from Florida doesn’t seem to know who the bankers are. He mispronounces Mr. Dimon’s name and asks the panel who “Mr. Countrywide” is. Mr. Lewis said he is “not Mr. Countrywide.”

3:27 p.m. | More calls for a moratorium: Mr. Frank notes that the Office of Thrift Supervision has also asked for a moratorium on foreclosures until the home modification plan is in effect.

3:20 p.m. | “The better angels”: Representative David Scott, Democrat of Georgia, asks the bankers to “let the better angels of our nature to shine through,” quoting Abraham Lincoln. He asks them to commit to having a moratorium on all foreclosures until the Treasury secretary can implement his rescue plan. “That would be a tremendous gesture,” Mr. Scott says. Mr. Lewis asks for a time frame, Mr. Scott says three weeks. Mr. Pandit as well as everyone else says they will commit to keeping people in their homes.

3:10 p.m. | Reaching out to homeowners: Responding to a question from Representative Rubén Hinojosa, Democrat of Texas, Mr. Pandit says Citigroup tries to reach out to homeowners before they start missing payments.

3:08 p.m. | “They are suffering”: Representative Walter B. Jones, Republican of North Carolina, says: “For God sakes Mr. Lewis, do everything you can to free credit because they are suffering”

3:04 p.m. | And we’re back: Apparently in the middle of questioning.

3 p.m. | Still on break: Voting takes time, apparently.

2:22 p.m. | Break: A 20-minute recess while the representatives vote.

By the way, some advice for the panel: Mr. Blankfein’s name is pronounced “Blank-fine,” not “Blank-fin” or “Blank-feen.” Mr. Dimon’s name is pronounced “Dye-mon.”

Separately, banking chiefs: make sure your microphone is on before you start speaking. Thank you from the spectators’ seats.

2:15 p.m. | Was the bailout necessary?: At the time, Mr. Blankfein and Mr. Lewis say, no. But in hindsight, yes, in order to bring about stability.

A followup: Why can’t consumers get access to credit? Mr. Lewis ventures that it’s because of declining home values. Some verbal jujitsu follows, as the congressman assails the once-plentiful availability of credit cards. (His own daughter was once offered a card when she was younger.) “We’re the ones having to bail you out because of the losses there,” he says. The chiefs remain silent.

Now we move onto best practices. Applied to risk management, Mr. Mack says, the term would mean that the risk-management team would report directly to the chief executive and not a trading group.

2:11 p.m. | Where’s the private capital?: When private capital will come back into the banks? Mr. Blankfein says that it will come when uncertainty lifts.

Over-regulation is a potential problem, some of the chiefs agree with their interrogator.

2:06 p.m. | Where’s the money?: Will the banks lose more money? Mr. Stumpf recollects his time as a collector and says that job losses are key to answering the question. Mr. Pandit agrees that unemployment is important; when asked about when credit will flow again, he says “we’re doing everything we can.”

Mr. Mack says Morgan Stanley is lending to corporations. It doesn’t do much to consumers because it’s not a very consumer-facing firm.

2:02 p.m. | Back to TARP 2: First and foremost, this admission from Mr. Blankfein: Trains are more relaxing and conducive to reading.

Will TARP 2 work, asks Representative Patrick T. McHenry of North Carolina? Mr. Blankfein, Mr. Dimon and Mr. Kelly say yes, if done well. Mr. Lewis, his Carolinian compatriot, is asked about transparency — on the government side? Sure, comes the reply.

1:55 p.m. | “America doesn’t trust you anymore.”: How many banks lent money to investors who in turn bought credit default swaps? How many invested in CDS or off-balance-sheet vehicles like SIVs? More than a few executives raise their hands at one point or another.

“All of your or at least most of you engaged in at least some of the activities that led us to this crisis,” the interlocutor responds, specifically SIVs. “I can’t believe that no one has prosecuted any of you over this.”

Coming to Congress on their bicycles, after having bought Girl Scout cookies, and saying they’re sorry? Not enough. The congressman compares banking chiefs to bank robbers who say they’re sorry.

1:44 p.m. | Autos and bonuses: What are these banking chiefs’ views on the viability of the American auto industry? Several executives say that they are supportive of the industry, including by making auto loans.

Back to TARP money received in 2008, salary and bonuses, or lack thereof.

Mr. Stumpf: $25 billion. $850,000 salary. No bonus.

Mr. Pandit: $45 billion. $1 million salary. No bonus. He will take $1 salary until Citi turns a profit again.

Mr. Mack: $10 billion. $800,000 salary. No bonus.

Mr. Logue: $2 billion. $1 million salary. No bonus.

Mr. Lewis: $15 billion. $1.5 million salary. No “incentive.”

Mr. Kelly: $3 billion. $1 million salary. No bonus.

Mr. Dimon: $25 billion. $1 million salary. No bonus.

Mr. Blankfein: $10 billion. $650,000 salary. No bonus.

1:39 p.m. | All apologies?: Should the industry apologize for what happened? Mr. Mack says, essentially, yes, the industry has responsibility to shoulder for what has happened to the economy and to shareholders. He accepts some.

1:35 p.m. | What’s needed next: What can the government do to bring back stability? Mr. Pandit: stabilize housing and create jobs. Mr. Geithner’s speech on Tuesday was a good start, he said, but banks are awaiting more details.

Mr. Dimon: good fiscal stimulation is crucial. Mortgage-modifications are good.

Mr. Lewis: The TARP doesn’t have to have permanently changed the face of the free-market economy in the United States. Mr. Kelly agrees.

1:32 p.m. | Raise your hands: An insistent Mr. Ackerman asks about dividend payments made after the banks received government money. “Money is fungible, don’t insult our intelligence,” he says, before urging the banking chiefs to adopt a policy forbidding the payment of dividends.

Then he asks who owns or leases a corporate jet. All but Mr. Blankfein raise their hands. Mr. Ackerman again strongly suggests that banking chiefs forego their private corporate jets.

He then asks Mr. Pandit why Citi will not issue additional securities to protect taxpayers. Mr. Pandit says that he and his firm are striving to make taxpayers a profit.

1:22 p.m. | We’re back: Representative Scott Garrett of New Jersey asks Mr. Blankfein about Goldman’s exposure to A.I.G. The banking chief says that the insurance giant was a major player in the credit markets. While its notional exposure was $20 billion, Goldman significantly hedged its exposure and was collateralized, Mr. Blankfein said.

12:35 p.m | Break time: The hearing takes a short recess. The grilling will resume at 1:15 p.m.

12:32 p.m. | Skin in the game: The banking chiefs are asked how much personal money they have invested in their companies in the last six months. Mr. Dimon says $12 million, Mr. Lewis says he bought 400,000 Bank of America shares, and Mr. Pandit says $8.4 million; the rest of them say they had put nothing new into their companies.

12:30 p.m. | Where did it go?: The overarching question of the day gets asked again: “What did you do with the new money?” asks Gary Ackerman of New York, who comments that it seems to him that the banks aren’t loaning it out. Mr. Dimon says bank lending is flat year over year, but adds that there is a huge amount of nonbank lending that has gone away. Car financing, money funds and others stopped lending, he says, adding that JPMorgan lent out $50 billion to $75 billion to nonprofits and other institutions.

12:24 p.m. | Paying it back: Executives at some big banks have already suggested that they want to repay their TARP funding as quickly as possible. But Mr. Dimon of JPMorgan tells the panel that there is a legal impediment to paying the TARP money back before three years, even if he wanted to, because TARP recipients are required to replace it with private funds, and many banks don’t want to do that.

12:22 p.m. | Pay restrictions: Mr. Hensarling asks about executive compensation restrictions and whether they will lead to a loss of talent; this is an issue commonly raised by those who oppose pay limits for TARP recipients. Mr. Mack of Morgan Stanley says that at the most senior levels, he’s not concerned, but below that level he as already seen defections to European competitors and others.

12:19 p.m. | Too big to fail: Ms. Capito poses this question to the banking bosses on the panel: Are you too big to fail? Mr. Pandit replies that his company is a large bank, and in the current environment, nobody has been spared. But he also notes that Citi is reorganizing into two parts that are a lot smaller. Mr. Lewis says that diversified companies have done better, but asserts that the issue is not size, but a financial institution’s role in the capital markets in general. The real question, he says, is not size but “if you’re systemically important.”

12:17 p.m. | Back to credit cards: Representative Shelley Moore Capito of West Virginia revisits the credit card issue, asking why card holders who haven’t missed any payments are seeing an increase in their interest rates. Mr. Pandit responds that Citigroup hadn’t raised rates in two years, and states that funding costs went up, so they had to raise rates. Mr. Dimon tells the congresswoman to send him any customers who think they shouldn’t have their rates increased and he’ll deal with them.

12:10 p.m. | The Pfizer-Wyeth deal: The bankers are asked about the merger of drug companies Pfizer and Wyeth, which is being financed by billions of dollars in loans, some from banks represented at today’s hearing. The question comes from Representative Nydia M. Velazquez of New York, who says that the merger is expected to result in the loss of 19,000 jobs and wants to know why banks are lending only to big companies but not to small business. None of the bankers answer the question.

12:00 p.m. | Fannie and Freddie: Representative Edward R. Royce asks to what extent the mortgage securitization process, led by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, was part of the problem. Mr. Stumpf of Wells Fargo — which originated relatively few of the most exotic kinds of mortgage loans — says that the problem started a long time before 2007 with “crazy things” such as negative amortization loans and so-called liar loans. “There’s no question that Fannie and Freddie played a part in that,” Mr. Stumpf says.

11:58 a.m. | Valuing bad assets: Responding to a question from Representative Luis V. Gutierrez of Illinois, Mr. Pandit of Citigroup says that valuing assets on a company’s books is a complicated process. One way to do it is for the government to take the bad assets, take the losses and then “send us a bill” when the economy recovers.

11:51 a.m. | Super-regulator: Representative Peter King of New York asks about the creation of a systemic risk regulator and how that would work. Mr. Mack says the idea of a systemic risk regulator “is critical” and praises the idea of combining several regulators and having more global coordination. “We need to have a super-regulator,” he says.

Mr. Dimon also states that the regulators aren’t to blame for what happened, but says there is an alphabet soup of regulators and several unregulated businesses. He says he sees tremendous benefits to having one regulator that looks at everything with an eye toward systematic risk and suggests the Federal Reserve could be up to the job.

11:44 a.m. | Those Merrill bonuses: The conversation inevitably turns to the $3.6 billion in bonuses paid to Merrill Lynch employees right before the firm was bought by Bank of America. Representative Carolyn Maloney of New York asks: “How can you justify paying bonuses to managers who are running the company into the ground so much that they were forced to sell?”

Mr. Lewis says his personal involvement was very limited, but states that his company urged Merrill to reduce the bonuses substantially. Still, he says, Bank of America had no authority to force them to do anything before the merger closed.

11:39 a.m. | ‘An awful year’: “This is going to be an awful year for the credit card industry,” Mr. Lewis says, adding that he is prepared to deal with the loses. Mr. Dimon says he expects credit card losses at JPMorgan to be more than $10 billion this year, or 8 percent of the total credit card debt outstanding.

11:32 a.m. | Credit card rates: Representative Maxine Waters of California wants to know if any of the bankers have increased the interest rates on credit cards since they received TARP money. Mr. Lewis says Bank of America increased rates on 9 percent of its customers in 2008. The other bank executives also raise their hands and say they increased credit card rates.

Then Ms. Waters raises another issue: She says Bank of America paid itself $30 million in fees just to take the TARP money. Mr. Lewis says he doesn’t know what she is talking about. Mr. Pandit of Citigroup says the fees were paid to underwriters for issuing government-backed debt, which is standard industry practice.

11:27 a.m. | A market solution?: Is it time for the government to step back and let the market work through the toxic assets on banks’ balance sheets? That’s what Representative Randy Neugebauer is asking: “The deeper we get into this, the tougher the exit strategy is,” he says.

Mr. Blankfein says that accounting regimes allow banks to mark their assets at what they expect the value would be in the future. Mr. Pandit says his company has sold a lot of troubled assets over the last few months, but adds that there is not enough capital in the market to buy these assets unless they go for extremely low prices.

11:24 a.m. | When the wind shifted: Mr. Lewis of Bank of America says he began seeing economic headwinds in late July 2007 but thought “the economy was in pretty good shape” going into the fourth quarter of that year. Mr. Blankfein of Goldman says Wall Street became aware of the problem earlier, but people didn’t realize how much Wall Street was tied to Main Street.

11:20 a.m. | Preventing a replay: Representative Paul E. Kanjorski asks about what steps the government could take to make sure “this never happens again.” He also asks the Wall Street bankers how they missed the problems in the economy.

11:15 a.m. | A TARP optimist: Mr. Bachus notes that he thinks the TARP funds will be a very good investment for American taxpayers. He praises the banks for their efforts to reduce risk and leverage. He also says he “was shocked that lending wasn’t down 15 or 20 percent.” Mr. Bachus asks if the banks can avoid forcing good borrowers to make principal payments.

11:10 a.m. | On bonuses: “If you weren’t getting a bonus,” Mr. Frank asks, “what would you not do? Would you take longer lunches or leave early on Wednesday?” He goes on: “Why do you need to be bribed to have your interests aligned with the company?” Mr. Mack replies that “we love what we do, if you gave us no bonus we would still be here.”

11:08 a.m. | Foreclosures: Mr. Frank urges all the banks to withhold any foreclosures until the government’s rescue plan goes into effect.

11:06 a.m. | Opening statements end: It’s question time — or castigating time, depending on your point of view.

11:01 a.m. | And yet more loans: Mr. Stumpf, of Wells Fargo, says the bank made $72 billion in new loans in the fourth quarter. “We do business and lend money the old fashion way — responsibly and prudently,” he says. “We are Americans first and bankers second.”

10:55 a.m. | Citi’s plane: Toward the end of his speech, Mr. Pandit goes off script and acknowledges the public criticism earlier this month when Citigroup was set to take control of a new $50 million corporate jet. He apologizes for not reacting fast enough to the public outrage: “I get the new reality,” Mr. Pandit says.

10:52 a.m. | A few missteps: Mr. Mack says Morgan Stanley has increased transparency and reduced risk, “but they didn’t do everything right” and he takes full responsibility for that. In the fourth quarter, the firm raised over $50 billion in debt for corporations like General Electric and Time Warner Cable. Later, he says: “I know that the Americans are outraged about compensation costs.”

10:48 a.m. | Mutual funds: Mr. Logue, of State Street, says that after receiving the TARP funds, his firm helped made $1.5 billion in capital available to mutual funds to help them meet their redemption requests.

10:42 a.m. | More loans: Bank of America is lending, Mr. Lewis says in his opening statement. In the fourth quarter, the bank made $115 billion of new loans to consumers and businesses and refinanced thousands of loans over the quarter. “We understand that taxpayers are angry” and they deserve to know how we are spending their money, he said.

10:39 a.m. | A profitable bank:: Mr. Kelly, of Bank of New York Mellon, noted that his bank was profitable every quarter last year and said it didn’t really need the TARP funds. The funds allowed the bank to purchase mortgage securities and $900 million of debt securities from other financial institutions. “We have not used any of the funds to pay dividends or compensation,” he says.

10:34 a.m. | JPMorgan’s loans: Jamie Dimon is next — the bankers are speaking in alphabetical order — and he said he did not seek the government’s money. He also tells lawmakers that JPMorgan made over $150 billion in new loans in the fourth quarter, not including $50 billion in loans to other banks that the firm made on an overnight basis.

10:32 a.m. | Goldman’s bonuses: Addressing the sensitive issue of compensation, Mr. Blankfein says Goldman’s bonuses in 2008 were down 65 percent on average, and senior executives’ bonuses were down 75 percent. Goldman’s top management decided not to take any bonuses this year.

10:28 a.m. | Now to the bankers: Mr. Blankfein, the Goldman honcho, points out that his firm recently committed capital to student lender Sallie Mae to allow it to make more loans.

10:24 a.m. | Market confidence (or lack thereof): Representative David Scott of Georgia seems to want the bankers to single-handedly restore confidence to the markets at the hearing. “If there’s one thing you gentlemen can do today is to demonstrate that what has happened in the past is an aberration,” he said. “At the heart of this hearing is confidence.”

10:22 a.m. | Public perception: Representative J. Gresham Barrett of South Carolina says “his folks” haven’t seen the evidence that the money given to the banks is working and making their lives better.

10:17 a.m. | Government’s role: Representative Jeb Hensarling of Texas says some of the public pillorying that the bank executives are going to take today is deserved, but adds that government also has to own up to its responsibility as well.

10:13 a.m. | A distinction: Representative Spencer Bachus, the Republican from Alabama who is the committee’s ranking Republican member, offers a word of caution — “some wanted the money; some didn’t want the money” — and says it would be a mistake for the American people to look at this group as one group.

10:10 a.m. | ‘Collateral benefit’: “We are now in a serious negative economic situation,” Mr. Frank says in his opening remarks. “We have to get out from under where we are now.” Now he points to the banking executives. “You are the recipients of collateral benefit, but you need to understand how angry that makes people.”

10:05 a.m. | Not a laughing matter: Representative Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who chairs the committee, lays down the law to the audience. While he says he supports free speech, he wants the audience to stay silent, including any “forced laughter” that may come out of anyone’s comments.

10:01 a.m. | Paparazzi: Before the hearing starts, the always-colorful Jamie Dimon asks the gaggle of photographers, “What do you guys do with all these pictures?”

9:23 a.m. | The bankers’ statements: In statements submitted before the hearing and posted on the committee’s Web site, the executives generally defended how they have been deploying the funds they received from the government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP.

Mr. Blankfein of Goldman Sachs said his firm was “actively putting our capital to work”; Mr. Lewis of Bank of America said his company was “lending far more” that it would have without the TARP; Mr. Dimon of JPMorgan said his firm continued to make loans even as it sought to maintain a “fortress balance sheet.”

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Bank Executives Tell House Panel They Are Lending