L'Italia (e il Regno Unito) fatica(no) a collocare le proprie obbligazioni

The UK and Italy struggled to sell bonds on Thursday in a fresh sign of the difficulties governments are facing because of the debt needed for economic stimulus packages and bank recapitalisations.

The two bond auctions saw both governments forced to pay higher yields to attract investors and Italy scaled back the amount on offer.

Analysts say it is an "ominous" warning that debt raising is likely to become even tougher in the coming months if problems are emerging so soon after government announcements to increase issuance. A record of more than €1,000bn ($1,290bn) of debt is expected to be issued in Europe next year.

Significantly, the bond auctions were for shorter-dated securities, usually the most sought after.

Roger Brown, global head of rates research at UBS, said: "The UK auction was dire. I do not remember one as bad for shorter-dated bonds. It is an ominous sign of trouble ahead.

"It is surprising to us that the UK Treasury should encounter such weak demand for a four-year gilt in only the second auction since Monday's pre-Budget report, when record levels of issuance were announced."

Giuseppe Maraffino, fixed income strategist at UniCredit, added: "The Italians ran into difficulties because of the lack of liquidity and investors. People are worried about the large amount of supply and the general environment."

Both the UK and Italian governments had to offer an extra 10 basis points compared with similar existing debt to entice investors to sell £3.75bn in four-year bonds and €1.4bn in three-year bonds respectively. The Italians also raised a lower amount than expected because of worries over weak demand.

Analysts emphasise that expectations of interest rate cuts in the UK, Europe and the US are supporting the bond markets and keeping yields historically low. For example, 10-year gilt yields this week dropped below 4 per cent for the first time since records began in 1961.

However, with economies contracting, lower tax receipts and rising benefit payments mean countries could face higher debt servicing costs as overall debt levels rise.

Among European countries, the UK and Italy may face the greatest difficulties because of their large debt programmes. The UK announced plans to raise an extra £37.4bn ($56.5bn) in gilts this year in the PBR.

This takes the overall total to £146.4bn – an all-time high and nearly three times the amount raised in 2007-08. The Debt Management Office forecasts bond issuance remaining high, at an average of £135bn a year, until 2013.

The Italians are forecast to issue up to €220bn in bonds next year, with €100bn in redemptions in the first half of the year – about €20bn higher than usual – putting the government under greater pressure to raise money.

UBS has warned that Italy's large debt burden of 103 per cent to gross domestic product – the highest in the eurozone – is unsustainable, forecasting it will rise to 107 per cent by the end of next year.

FT.com

Porsche: vendite in calo

Outlook: Porsche also affected by the general downward trend

Porsche Automobil Holding SE expects a significant drop in sales in the current business year 2008/09. The signs of a severe decrease in demand in the automotive industry are unmistakable the world over, and it is virtually impossible to calculate further developments particularly in the USA, Porsche's largest single market.

Porsche will hardly be able to escape this downward trend, so that currently we do not assume that we will be able to repead the high total sales of the previos business year. This is indeed borne out by revenue and sales figures in the current business year from 1 August to mid-November 2008, which indicate that turnover in the first four months of the business year 2008/09, that is up to 30 November 2008, will be slightly above two billion Euro following 2.36 billion Euro in the same period last year. Sales show a similar development, amounting to 25,200 units after 30,700 units year-on-year. The exact figures for the first four months will be published by Porsche in the Interim Report due in mid-December 2008.

Porsche.com

Nessun skateboarder nella stanza dei bottoni

«An Economist piece about incoming Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner explored Mr. Geither’s background in the Clinton Administration and his experience handling crises. But a number of blogs were more interested in a middle paragraph that that discusses Mr. Geithner’s youthful appearance and fondness for naughty words. It also notes that he snowboards and has tried skateboarding. The description prompted the Daily Showblog to correct an earlier post that described Mr. Geithner as “boring.”

A skateboarding Treasury secretary would indeed be something special. However, a Fed spokesman said yesterday that, in fact, Mr. Geithner doesn’t actively participate in skateboarding.

It was disappointing news, at least to this old skater — and probably a lot of others. You see, surfing and snowboarding have their government officials. Sen. John Kerry has been seen snowboarding and Hawaii State Sen.Fred Hemmings is a surfing legend. President-elect Barack Obama is known to bodysurf, which isn’t exactly surfing but surfers were still stoked .

We couldn’t find any skateboarders, at least active ones, in national office (we couldn’t find a survey). Best we could find was Tom Miller, who is indeed a ripper, as well as chief of staff for Portland, Oregon, Mayor-elect Sam Adams.

There are some theories as to why surfers and snowboarders have outdone skaters in seeking political office. Surfing and snowboarding tend to cost more, and this may act as a social filter.

Also, a lot of people start surfing and snowboarding in middle age. It’s certainly possible to pick-up skateboarding later in life, but few adults can stomach the time and pain commitment that learning skateboarding requires.

So it seems skaters will have to wait a bit longer for the first skateboarding Treasury secretary. Change can only happen so fast».

Real Time Economics

Pandit si giustifica (senza convincere)

Da Reuters.com

«Citigroup Inc Chief Executive Vikram Pandit on Tuesday blamed prior management for diving too deeply into real estate, causing losses that led to this week's massive government bailout of the second-largest U.S. bank by assets.

"What went wrong is we had tremendous concentration in the sense we put a lot of our money to work against U.S. real estate," Pandit said in an interview on PBS' Charlie Rose show. "We got here by lending money, and putting money to work in the U.S. real estate market, in a size that was probably larger than what we ought to have done on a diversification basis."

The government late Sunday rescued Citigroup by agreeing to shoulder most potential losses from a $306 billion portfolio of risky assets, and by injecting $20 billion of new capital, in its biggest effort to prevent a large U.S. bank from failing.

Citigroup has lost $20.3 billion in the last year, and many expect further losses from credit cards and other areas tied to the global economic crisis to pile up.

Since closing Friday at $3.77, Citigroup shares have risen 61 percent, and closed Tuesday up 13 cents at $6.08 on Monday. They have nevertheless tumbled 79 percent this year, after closing last year at $29.44.

Pandit said in the interview that short-sellers, as well as investors worried about Citigroup's asset quality, were among those who drove the bank's shares down in recent sessions, and that it was important "that we got control of the situation."

"I can completely understand how people on Main Street, people who are not close to this industry, would be furious at what's happened," he said.

Some wealthy investors have begun or pledged to begin buying Citigroup shares.

A Mexican brokerage controlled by Carlos Slim, one of the world's wealthiest people, spent about $150 million to buy nearly 29 million Citigroup shares between Nov 19 and Nov 25.

Meanwhile, Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal last week said he plans to boost his stake in the bank to 5 percent from less than 4 percent».

Altri 800 miliardi dalla FED

«The Federal Reserve, in another massive life-support intervention for the U.S. financial system, on Tuesday announced a $600 billion program to buy mortgage-related debt and securities and a $200 billion facility to support consumer debt securities,

The U.S. central bank said it would buy up to $100 billion in debt issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks, the government-sponsored mortgage finance enterprises.

The Fed also said it would buy up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.

The move is intended to strike at the heart of U.S. economic woes, the collapsed housing market.

"This action is being taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved financial conditions more generally," the Fed said in a statement.

The central bank also launched a $200 billion facility to back consumer loans, including student, auto, and credit card loans and loans backed by the federal Small Business Administration».

Reuters.com

Modiano analizza la crisi

Su Il Sussidiario.net una interessante analisi di Pietro Modiano circa le ragioni della crisi finanziaria.

«Qual è allora la sua interpretazione?

La genesi è dovuta a un eccesso straordinario di liquidità creatosi dopo l’11 settembre e col fatto che negli Usa si tendeva a favorire l’indebitamento delle famiglie a scopo anticiclico o addirittura sociale. La somma di grande liquidità e basso rischio ha prodotto una riduzione dei tassi di interesse e un’abbondanza di credito in tutto il mondo che ha fatto del gran bene al pianeta. Però i bassi tassi di interesse hanno messo in condizione le banche di non guadagnare abbastanza per capitale impiegato e hanno generato nelle banche la tendenza a vendere i propri rischi di credito e a comprare rischi di credito altrui, attraverso strumenti derivati o altro, comunque credito trasformato in titoli. Questo ha prodotto, a parità di assorbimento di capitale delle banche, un’assunzione di rischi di credito enormemente superiore a quello che ci sarebbe stato in assenza della leva.

Più delicato è il tema delle “responsabilità” di malfunzionamento individuale o sistemico…

L’utilizzo degli strumenti di finanza sofisticata è stato un comportamento certamente razionale da parte di ogni singolo banchiere, e ognuno aveva il dovere di utilizzarlo perché era un modo legittimo, nell’era dei bassi tassi di interesse, per produrre reddito per le proprie banche a parità di capitale. L’effetto sistemico si è rivelato devastante quando si è capito che il mercato non dava i segnali giusti sui rischi di credito: il mercato, fino a quel momento, non aveva mai “segnalato” l’eccesso di credito. Lo ha fatto con una catastrofe.

Come e quando è accaduto?

Quando un americano di troppo ha deciso di non rimborsare il suo mutuo – o di rimborsare i prestiti meno di quanto previsto: e allora tutti i portafogli di credito hanno visto ridotto il loro valore, compromettendo il poco capitale delle banche che in essi avevano investito. Questo ha prodotto un effetto domino. Fin qui non c’è stata una cattiva volontà del bancario. Poi si può anche dire: “avete spinto i ritorni sul capitale di ogni singola banca troppo avanti perché avevate le stock options…” questo non spiega però il problema principale: perché, di fronte all’eccesso, il mercato non ha dato i segnali propri dell’eccesso?

Qual è la sua risposta?

Nessuno individualmente ha capito che si era di fronte a un eccesso. Perché non è emerso è il problema vero. Un mercato super efficiente come il mercato finanziario, se non produce prezzi che segnalano e danno la misura dell’entità delle tensioni in campo, presenti e future, è un mercato che non funziona. Ma questo significa negare in radice la teoria economica sulla quale abbiamo messo in piedi il mondo che conosciamo degli ultimi venti, forse trent’anni. Ed è un problema serio, quello sul quale più mi interrogo. Vuol dire che sul mercato che, nella storia, più si è avvicinato a quello della concorrenza perfetta, per disponibilità di informazioni, numero di operatori, dimensioni e strumenti i prezzi “non hanno funzionato”».

Citi: quando il risk managament è colluso

Sul New York Times è apparso un articolo qualche giorno fa nel quale viene messa in luce l'inadeguatezza del sistema di risk management di Citigroup. Il ritratto che ne esce è davvero impietoso.

Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets

La rabbia di Barry

Barry Ritholtz nel suo blog The Big Picture esprime stamani tutta la sua rabbia circa il piano di salvataggio di Citi.

Citi Bailout

Anche la stampa inizia a risentire della crisi

Negli USA le spese pubblicitarie hanno subito un calo del 20% nel settore del lusso, imponendo agli editori importanti tagli di costi.

NYTimes.com

L'agenda di Citi nello scorso fine settimana

The majority of you voted in yesterday’s poll that Citigroup was not likely to survive the weekend as an independent entity. C’s board is meeting this weekend - and the agenda probably goes something like this:

9:oo AM: convene.

9:15 AM: openly question what is affecting Prince Alwaleed’s brain and causing him to support Vikram Bandit. Attempt to determine if it is hashish. Attempt to determine if board should inquire as to the source of his hashish and attempt to procure.

9:3o - 1o:3o AM: Vikram Bandit Happy Time Dartboard Hour

1o:3o-11:3o AM: Early lunch of macaroni and cheese provided by Dick Parsons. Print is dead. Someone suggests going to check out the End The Fed rally and gets kicked out of the room

11:45 AM: Roberto Hernández Ramírez writes up a TARP application for Banco Nacional de Mexico while everyone else plays Brickbreaker. Asks board to sign it in support

Noon-1:ooPM: Various four year olds are brought into the room to coach board on proper whine-pitch for “begging voice”

1:oo - 6:oo PM: Blackberries are reallocated from Brickbreaker to repeatedly dialing Hank Paulson’s home/cell/office/wife/dog, Neel Kashkari’s home/cell/office/wife/dog, pleading for cash

6:15 PM: Meeting ends. C. Michael Armstrong reminds everyone to pick up a NYTimes tomorrow to check out the bitchin’ full page Citi Never Sleeps ad.

Okay, they are really supposed to be discussing whether or not to sell off the business units The Bandit claims they won’t be selling off, whether or not they want to retain The Bandit as chair, or whether they are going to sell off the whole shebang. My money is, of course, on government intervention and a shareholder wipeout. Watch this space…

LOLFed.com

Il piano di salvataggio per Citigroup

Summary of Terms 

Eligible Asset Guarantee 

Eligible Assets: Asset pool consisting of loans and securities backed by residential real
estate and commercial real estate, and their associated hedges, as agreed,
and other such assets as the U.S. Government (USG) has agreed to
guarantee. Each specific asset must be identified on signing of guarantee
agreement. Assets will remain on the books of institution but will be
appropriately “ring-fenced.”

Size: Up to $306 bn in assets to be guaranteed (based on valuation agreed upon
between institution and USG).

Term of Guarantee: FDIC standard loss-sharing protocol: Guarantee is in place for 10 years
for residential assets, 5 years for non-residential assets.

Deductible: Institution absorbs all losses in portfolio up to $29 bn (in addition to
existing reserves)

Any losses in portfolio in excess of that amount are shared USG (90%)
and institution (10%).

USG share will be allocated as follows:
UST (via TARP) second loss up to $5 bn;
FDIC takes the third loss up to $10 bn;

Financing: Federal Reserve funds remaining pool of assets with a non-recourse loan,
subject to the institution’s 10% loss sharing, at a floating rate of OIS plus
300bp. Interest payments are with recourse to the institution.

Fee for Guarantee -
Preferred Stock: Institution will issue $7 bn of preferred stock with an 8% dividend rate
(under terms described below). $4 bn of preferred will be issued to UST.
$3 bn will be issued to the FDIC.

Management of
Assets: USG will provide institution with a template to manage guaranteed assets
This template will include the use of mortgage modification procedures
adopted by the FDIC, unless otherwise agreed.

Risk Weighting: Institution will retain the income stream from the guaranteed assets. Risk
weighting for assets will be 20%.

Dividends: Institution is prohibited from paying common stock dividends, in excess
of $.01 per share per quarter, for 3 years without UST/FDIC/FRB consent.
A factor taken into account for consideration of the USG’s consent is the
ability to complete a common stock offering of appropriate size.

Executive
Compensation: An executive compensation plan, including bonuses, that rewards long-
term performance and profitability, with appropriate limitations, must be
submitted to, and approved by, the USG

Corporate
Governance: Other matters as specified

Preferred Securities 

Issuer: Citigroup (“Citi”)

Initial Holder: United States Department of the Treasury (“UST”).

Size: $20 billion

Security: Preferred, liquidation preference $1,000 per share. (Depending upon the
available authorized preferred shares, the UST may agree to purchase
preferred with a higher liquidation preference per share, in which case the
UST may require Citi to appoint a depositary to hold the Preferred and
issue depositary receipts.)

Ranking: Same terms as preferred issued in CPP.

Term: Perpetual life.

Dividend: The Preferred will pay cumulative dividends at a rate of 8% per annum.
Dividends will be payable quarterly in arrears on February 15, May 15,
August 15 and November 15 of each year.

Redemption: In stock or cash, as mutually agreed between UST and Citi. Otherwise,
redemption terms of CPP preferred terms apply.

Restrictions
on Dividends: Institution is prohibited from paying common stock dividends, in excess
of $.01 per share per quarter, for 3 years without UST consent. A factor
taken into account for consideration of the UST’s consent is the ability to
complete a common stock offering of appropriate size.

Repurchases: Same terms as preferred issued in CPP.

Voting rights: The Preferred shall be non-voting, other than class voting rights on (i) any
authorization or issuance of shares ranking senior to the Preferred, (ii) any
amendment to the rights of Preferred, or (iii) any merger, exchange or
similar transaction which would adversely affect the rights of the
Preferred.

If dividends on the Preferred are not paid in full for six dividend periods,
whether or not consecutive, the Preferred will have the right to elect 2
directors. The right to elect directors will end when full dividends have
been paid for (i) all prior dividend periods in the case of cumulative
Preferred or (ii) four consecutive dividend periods in the case of non-
cumulative Preferred.

Transferability: The Preferred will not be subject to any contractual restrictions on
transfer.

Executive
Compensation: An executive compensation plan, including bonuses, that rewards long-
term performance and profitability, with appropriate limitations, must be
submitted to, and approved by, the USG.

Summary of Warrant Terms 

Warrant: Institution will issue a warrant to UST for an aggregate exercise value of
10% of the total preferred issued to USG (in both transactions) ($2.7 bn).

Exercise Price: The strike price will be equal to $10.61 per share (the 20 day trailing
average ending on November 21, 2008). The warrants issued to UST are
not subject to reduction based on additional offerings.

Term: Ten years, immediately exercisable, in whole or in part. 

I bond italiani fanno sempre più paura

"Italian bond yields rose to 110 basis points against German bunds yesterday while those of Greece jumped to 149bp - up by around 20bp this week - on benchmark 10-year securities. This compares with spreads of 65bp for Italy and 73bp for Greece at the height of the Bear Stearns crisis in March".

FT.com

È finita l'epoca dei bulli

Il divieto di vendite allo scoperto deve essere eliminato

Secondo Arturo Bris, autore di una ricerca circa gli effetti del divieto di short selling negli Stati Uniti, la cura è stata peggiore del male.

WSJ.com

La crisi, il mercato e il pensiero liberale

Il ripensamento critico della finanza innescato dalla crisi finanziaria coinvolge la stessa nozione di economia di mercato. Ma chi ha fallito, lo Stato o il mercato? Paradossalmente lo Stato, che non ha saputo dare regole esaustive e supervisori attenti. Si è instaurata una religione liberistica che vede nell'intervento pubblico sempre e comunque una indebita compressione della libertà d'impresa.

La voce.info

È all'orizzonte una spirale deflazionaria?

Deflation: Disaster or Just A Nice Discount? su Real Time Economics

La FSA pubblica una guida per la gestione dei rumors

Su Market Watch di novembre la FSA prende posizione sui rumors e formula chiare linee guida in relazione alle politiche di gestione dei rumors stessi, di formazione del personale e di comunicazione interna delle regole fissate dalla società e di monitoraggio delle comunicazioni aziendali.

"Disseminating false or misleading information about companies, particularly in volatile or fragile market conditions, can be a very damaging form of market abuse which affects both the firm concerned as well as general market confidence. This has been the case in recent months, where unfounded rumours contributed to substantial share price movements in a number of financial institutions. While the most publicised cases pertained to falls in share prices resulting from the spread of unsubstantiated stories, all price movements triggered by unfounded rumours have the potential to distort markets and undermine market confidence."

immobilienblasen: How Daimler Wasted € 7 Billion On Buybacks In Just 15 Months......

"Just brilliant! I have nothing more to add that i havn´t already said at the time when the buybacks were introduced ( see Want My Buyback Back ..."Daimler Edition" & I Want My Buyback Back.....Daimler Is Doubling Down Again). All this has happened at a time when Dailmers net liquidity position ( in part due to the buybacks ) has worsened € 9 billion to almost € 46 billion ( see page 28 in Daimler Q3 Presentation)"

Che numeri!

Da Big Picture

• Over the past year, the S&P 500 index lost ~$1 trillion more than the entire 2000-2002 bear market, according to Standard & Poor’s. From the October 2007 highs of 1,565, to yesterday’s close of 806.58, the S&P 500 market capitalization lost $6.69 trillion. That’s almost $1 trillion more than entire 2000-03 bear market losses of $5.76 trillion. (Marketwatch)

• The S&P 500 hasn’t been this far below its 200-day moving average on a percentage basis since The Great Depression. (Doug Kass)

• CPI: U.S. consumer prices in October registered their largest single-month decline since before World War II. It is the largest monthly drop in the 61-year history of the data;

• PPI (Producer Price Index), down 2.8% for the month, was also record breaking drop.

• The dividend yield on the S&P 500 is now greater than the yield on the 10-year Treasury. That hasn’t happened since 1958. (Barron’s)

• First-time claims for U.S. unemployment insurance rose to the highest level since September 2001. The total number of people on unemployment benefit rolls jumped to the highest level since 1983.

• Housing starts fell to 791,000, off 38% from a year ago. That’s the slowest pace of starts since data began being compiled in 1959. Starts are now down 65% from the early 2006 peak — this has become the very worst housing downturn on record.

• Permits for new houses, at a 708,000 pace, were off 40% from a year ago, also the lowest total since it has been tracked starting in 1960. Put this into context of population — in 1960, the total U.S. population stood at 180 million — 60% of today’s 300 million.

• more Doug Kass: The 30-year return for BBB-rated corporate bonds is now greater than the 30-year return for stocks. So it has not paid to take equity risk for 30 years! (The Street.com)

• The TIPS Spread ( Treasury Inflation Protected Securities versus the 10-year Treasury) is at a record low 54 basis points (1997)

• The Russell 3,000 now has 1228 stocks a share price under $10. That’s 42% of the index. At the market’s 2002 lows, there were significantly less stocks trading below $10/share — just 884 (Bespoke Group).

Chi ha paura dei fondi sovrani?

Kavaljit Singh su Voxeu.org analizza il diffuso (e allo stato ingiustificato) timore nei confronti dei fondi sovrani (soprattutto se di provenienza mediorientale o asiatica) giungendo alla conclusione che non vi è alcun dato che faccia propendere per la necessità di interventi statali volti a inalzare barriere al libero trasferimento di capitali.

"Much of the paranoia in Europe over sovereign wealth funds is based on false assumptions. To date, not a single incident of sovereign wealth funds destabilising financial markets or pursuing strategic policy objectives has come to public notice.

Since sovereign wealth funds have no explicit liabilities, they are patient investors with long-term investment horizons. Nor are sovereign wealth funds prone to withdrawals by investors that could force them to liquidate their market positions quickly.

The overwhelming majority of sovereign funds are passive investors. The bulk of their money is invested in fixed-income instruments such as government and agency bonds. The foreign direct investment component of their total investments is not even 1% of assets in 2007.

In rare cases where sovereign wealth funds undertake direct investments, they do not seek controlling interests. Even the direct investments in the ailing US and European banks during 2007-08 are minor in ownership with no special rights or board representation. These direct investments were not hostile in nature and involved convertible bonds which would be converted into equity stakes in the future. Further, the investments were made in a transparent manner with the approval of host country banking regulatory authorities.

It also needs to be emphasised that the investments in Western banks were made at time when they were facing a severe liquidity crisis. The stakes in UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse were bought when their credit default swap (CDS) spreads were very high. The higher the CDS spread, the higher the perceived risk. By injecting billions of dollars into ailing banks, the sovereign wealth funds acted as counter-cyclical investors and enabled banks to continue their business. By and large, most sovereign wealth funds have suffered losses on their investments in the Western banks. The value of stakes of most sovereign wealth funds have plummeted with the spread of credit crisis."

Limit Company Size and Encourage Short Selling

Dylan Ratigan sul blog di Carl Icahn propone due interessanti soluzioni regolamentari per ridurre gli effetti negativi di eventuali future crisi finanziarie: (a) limitare la crescita dimensionale delle imprese affinché nessuna possa divenire "too big to fail"; e (b) incoraggiare lo short selling per far sì che le imprese mal gestite siano messe sotto pressione per tempo.

The Icahn Report

GM, Ford e Chrysler: meglio il fallimento del salvataggio

Secondo Gary Becker la soluzione migliore per le Big Three sarebbe il fallimento più che un salvataggio, in quanto ciò assicurerebbe la loro riorganizzazione, la riduzione dei costi legati ai privilegi assicurati ai dipendenti (anche grazie all'opera dei sindacati) e il ricambio del management.

Bail Out the Big Three Auto Producers? Not a Good Idea-Becker

Abercrombie non molla

Da FT Alphaville

"How important is brand image in these economically-tough times?

Abercrombie & Fitch, purveyor of $138 hoodies to US teens and Savile Row shoppers with more money than sense, is refusing to go on sale — even after its third-quarter profit plunged 46 per cent.

The 116-year-old retailer, which had said it wouldn’t lower prices to lure shoppers in order to protect its brand image, expects steeper declines. The drop in sales at stores open at least a year will accelerate to 26 percent in the fourth quarter, from 14 percent in the previous three-month period, it said. Abercrombie’s offerings include $90 jeans and $140 girls’ coats.

‘Without promotions, we fear November will be even worse,’ Adrienne Tennant, an analyst at Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co. in Arlington, Virginia, wrote in a Nov. 11 research note. ‘At this time, we do not expect the company to break with its non- promotional stance.’ She recommends buying the shares.

Market reaction to the strategy: shares down 21 per cent to $17.79 on Friday.

Contrast that to 2007 when the stock was trading at something like $80. Since then, there’s arguably been market-over-saturation from the likes of American Eagle and Aeropostale (both at lower price points than Abercrombie) and the company may well be cannibalising from its core A&F sales with younger and slightly cheaper offshoot, Hollister. But, despite price cuts by higher-end retailers like Chanel and Dolce & Gabbana, Abercrombie is refusing to budge on the sales front. All-American hubris, anyone?

We’d argue that Abercrombie is sitting at the crux of the recessionary trade up or trade down consumer debate — a discussion ranging from retailers to airlines. Will customers be saving their money for something of higher quality (presumeably indicated by the higher price) or switching to cheaper products? Or perhaps just not buying at all?

And just for emphasis, here is a trademark bare-chested Abercrombie male model sitting next to what is either a lamp or a tin hat. Based on that fourth-quarter sales outlook, we would think it’s the latter".

Media e futuro

Barry Ritholtz su The Big Picture fa notare come i media siano particolarmente negativi solo DOPO che i mercati sono crollati, nel senso che parlano di fatti già accaduti. È il loro mestiere. 

Barry poi mette in sequenza 30 anni di copertine di Time Magazine, con al centro i mercati in difficoltà, e a lato il rendimento del Dow Jones 10 anni dopo il giorno di pubblicazione, per rilevare che quel che un investitore deve guardare è il futuro e non il passato descritto dalla stampa.

Il futuro dal 1974 in avanti si è dimostrato sempre roseo.

   

TARP

Ecco la lista delle banche statunitensi che godono dei sussidi statali (principalmente sotto forma di iniezioni di capitale) previsti nel TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program).

Fino a ora sono stati utilizzati/richiesti 250 miliardi di dollari.

CNNMoney.com

Baseline Scenario

Simon Johnson, professore del MIT Sloan School of Management e ex-chief economist del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, ha deciso di aprire con Peter Boone e James Kwak il blog Baseline Scenario con lo scopo di comprendere la crisi economica mondiale e ragionare sui provvedimenti che possono essere assunti per farvi fronte.

I Paesi in cui le banche sono troppo grandi per essere salvate

John Hempton su Bronte Capital rileva che vi sono un certo numero di Paesi in cui vi sono banche troppo grandi per essere salvate dai governi: Regno Unito, Islanda, Svizzera, Danimarca, Svezia e Giordania. 

Anche Felix Salmon affronta l'argomento con particolare riferimento alla Svizzera ove UBS e Credit Suisse hanno un patrimonio complessivo pari a circa 3 trilioni di dollari, mentre la Svizzerra ha un prodotto interno lordo di 300 milioni. Alla fine del 2007 CS aveva un leva finanziaria di 40 volte, mentre UBS pari a 64 volte. Secondo Salmon  se UBS dovesse incorrere in una minusvalenza pari al 16% dei propri assets spazzerebbe via non solo i propri azionisti ma anche l'intero prodotto interno interno svizzero. 

Sia Hempton sia Salmon mettono in luce il fatto che l'unico governo che potrebbe essere in grado di salvare le banche poste in Paesi troppo piccoli per le loro dimensioni sono gli Stati Uniti.

I giudici chiudono il Kuwait Stock Exchange

(Il Sole 24 Ore Radiocor) - Milano, 13 nov - Le transazioni della Borsa del Kuwait, la seconda piazza del mondo arabo per capitalizzazione, sono state sospese fino al 17 novembre dai giudici, con una decisione senza precedenti mirata a limitare la caduta dei corsi. 

Il Tribunale amministrativo ha accolto il ricorso di un investitore che ha subito pesanti perdite. Al momento della sospensione, in una giornata che precede la chiusura settimanale del venerdi' e sabato degli scambi, l'indice Kse perdeva l'1,8% e si trovava a livelli minimi da circa 40 anni. Dal 24 giugno, giorno in cui aveva registrato un picco di 15.654 punti, l'indice ha perso oltre il 43%, piu' di 100 miliardi di dollari in termini di capitalizzazione.

Tgfin

Secondo il Wall Street Journal il governo kuwaitiano intende proporre appello contro la decisione dei giudici amministrativi.

La criminalità organizzata e il credit crunch

Le attività mafiose nel nostro Paese costituiscono ormai un giro di affari illecito che frutta cifre da capogiro, pari a quelle di una delle principali imprese italiane con ricavi pari a circa 130 miliardi annui ed un utile netto che sfiora i 70 miliardi.

È quanto si rileva dal rapporto "Sos impresa-Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese" presentato questa mattina dalla Confesercenti.

Il rapporto rileva inoltre che "il solo ramo commerciale della criminalità mafiosa e non, che incide direttamente sul mondo dell'impresa ed è oggetto specifico della ricerca, ha ampiamente superato i 92 miliardi di euro, una cifra intorno al 6% del Pil nazionale".

La Confesercenti rileva che "ogni giorno una massa enorme di denaro passa dalle tasche dei commercianti e degli imprenditori italiani a quelle dei mafiosi, qualcosa come 250 milioni di euro al giorno, 10 milioni l'ora, 160 mila euro al minuto".

Il presidente dell'associazione dei commercianti, Marco Venturi, illustrando i risultati di questo che è l'undicesimo rapporto della serie, ha commentato che "la crisi economica rende ancora più pericolosa la mafia. E' un allarme che ci sentiamo di lanciare nel momento in cui la mafia imprenditrice rischia di usare le debolezze e le incertezze dell'economia per rafforzare le sue posizioni. Occorre allora reagire con determinazione: serve un patto solenne per sancire una grande offensiva per la legalità".

Venturi, oltre che appellarsi a governo, forze politiche e sociali, ha chiesto "alle banche una maggiore disponibilità a finanziare le Pmi ed un'azione puntuale di segnalazione delle operazioni sospette".

Reuters.com

GM -23%

Le azioni di General Motors hanno chiuso con un ribasso del 23% a $3.36, dopo essere scese sino $3.02, la più bassa quotazione dal 1946. 

Gli analisti di Barclays Capital e Deutsche Bank hanno drasticamente tagliato il target price e l'investment rating sulle azioni della casa automobilistica americana. 

Unicredit si esprime con un sell sui bond GM.

WSJ.com

Circuit City è fallita

Circuit City Stores Inc, the No. 2 U.S. consumer electronics retailer, filed for bankruptcy protection on Monday just a few weeks before the start of the key holiday shopping season, becoming the largest retailer to file under Chapter 11 this year.

Reuters.com

La General Motors vale 0 (zero)

Secondo Rod Lache, analista di Deutsche Bank, GM non ha più valore per i propri azionisti. 

Lache ha abbassato il target price a 0 (zero) e ha consigliato ai propri clienti di fuggire immediatamente da GM. 

Lache ritiene che GM non sarà in grado di finanziare la propria operatività oltre il prossimo mese di dicembre e che il possibile (o forse probabile) salvataggio da parte del governo non lascerà nulla agli azionisti.

FT Alphaville.com

Bloomberg cita la FED in giudizio sui collaterali

Bloomberg ha avviato un giudizio nei confronti della Federal Reserve affinché questa renda pubblici gli strumenti finanziari che la banca centrale accetta come collaterali a fronte di 1.5 trilioni di dollari concessi in prestito al sistema bancario.

La causa è fondata sul U.S. Freedom of Information Act, che obbliga le agenzie federali a rendere pubblici i documenti che le riguardano.

Bloomberg.com

USA: la contrazione dei consumi nel settore dell'abbigliamento

Questi i dati delle vendite al dettaglio di ottobre 2008 rispetto a ottobre 2007 nel settore dell'abbigliamento negli Stati Uniti d'America:

• Neiman Marcus  -28%;
• Abercrombie & Fitch -20%;
  
• Saks -17%;
• GAP -16%;
  
• Nordstrom -16%.
  

Dal New York Times

Campaign Finance - Election 2008

Sul New York Times potete trovare un interessante grafico interattivo sui finanziamenti raccolti dai diversi candidati.

I dati del mercato immobiliare in Florida a settembre

Good News: Home Sales Up 25%: In September, Florida homes sold at a rate nearly 25 percent higher than a year ago and condo sales increased by 11 percent. Homes are selling, but they are selling for a lot less. In Ft. Lauderdale, median sales price fell 25 percent, 26 percent in Miami and 18 percent in West Palm- Beach-Boca Raton. Other areas saw a steeper drop in housing prices. In Fort Myers-Cape Coral, prices dropped 39 percent. In Fort-Pierce-Port St. Lucie, home sales were up 45 percent, but prices were down 32 percent. Likewise, In Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, home sales were up 41 percent with prices down 24 percent. Click here to read more.

Florida Number 3 in Foreclosures: Florida ranks third in the nation, behind Nevada and Arizona in the number of home foreclosures. In September, Florida has 64.2 filings per 1,000 households; Nevada had 77.8, and Arizona 74.6. For Florida, these numbers have doubled in the past year. In Miami, foreclosures have increased 46 percent, with a 36 percent in Palm Beach. Click here for more information.

Bottom Line: After months of decline, Florida's housing market may have finally bottomed out. Though the rate of foreclosures is still high, evidence that buyers are coming off the sidelines is good news, and a step in the right direction.

Bizjournals.com

Vota sul prediction market

Sul blog economico del NYT Economix, David Leonhardt propone un prediction market contest, con uno sguardo alle diverse scommesse possibili su Intrade.com in relazioni alle elezioni di oggi negli USA. 

Bastano 3 pronostici su 20.

È possibile votare sino alle 12.

The Big Picture

Maggiore trasparenza per i credit default swap

The Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. ha annunciato che a partire dal 4 novembre verranno resi pubblici, su base periodica, una serie di dati circa i CDS legati a obbligazioni e prestiti. I debitori interessati sono mille tra società e Stati.    

A partire da questa settimana saranno, quindi, accessibili una serie di informazioni rilevanti prima indisponibili alla più parte degli investitori che operano su tali strumenti.

Sono i primi passi per avere (prima possibile) un mercato efficiente e trasparente così come auspicato dalla Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Alea

La contrazione dei consumi inizia a mietere le prime vittime

Da CNNMoney.com

"RICHMOND, Va. (AP) -- Circuit City Stores Inc. said Monday it is closing about 20% of its U.S. stores - cutting thousands of jobs - in an effort to return the nation's No. 2 consumer electronics retailer to profitability.

The Richmond, Va.-based company said it will shutter 155 of its more than 700 stores in 55 markets, including Phoenix and Atlanta, by Dec. 31, laying off about 17% of its domestic work force. Circuit City (CC, Fortune 500) also said it will further reduce new store openings and plans to work with landlords to renegotiate leases, lower rent or terminate agreements.

The move comes as Circuit City heads into a crucial holiday shopping season that could determine its future, amid slower consumer spending that has even the least vulnerable retailers worried".

Il Fondo Monetario Internazionale e la durata della crisi

Tony Jackson sul Financial Times di oggi riprende uno studio del Fondo Monetario Internazionale sulle crisi degli ultimi 30 anni, il quale mette in luce che:

• le recessioni precedute da una crisi finanziaria tendono a essere più lunghe e profonde;

• le recessioni che seguono una crisi del sistema bancario sono peggiori di quelle precedute da una crisi dei mercati finanziari o dei mercati monetari;

• i Paesi che subiscono i maggiori contraccolpi sono quelli con un sistema finanziario arm's length come gli Stati Uniti e la Gran Bretagna (ovvero i Paesi in cui gli imprenditori sono in grado di raccogliere denaro sul mercato da un ampia schiera di soggetti a prescindere dalle relazioni personali). 

Il Fondo Monetario Internazionale ha rilevato, in particolare, che le recessioni precedute da una crisi del sistema bancario durano in media il doppio di quelle conseguenti a una crisi del sistema finanziario e che le perdite cumulate sono quattro volte superiori.  

Considerato che l'attuale crisi sembra rientrare in tutte e 3 i punti di cui sopra risulta difficile pensare che sarà di breve durata.

14 novembre: il TARP day si avvicina

Entro il 14 novembre le banche interessate ad aderire al Piano Paulson dovranno far pervenire al Tesoro la domanda di adesione al programma.

Ma in quante lo faranno? Non sembra che vi sarà una fila di banche innanzi al Tesoro, anzi.

Su WSJ vengono messe in luce le diffidenze di Wall Street rispetto al Piano. Quel che le banche temono maggiormente è il segnale negativo che verrebbe dato al mercato in caso di adesione e l'ingerenza del governo nella gestione degli istituti di credito post-adesione, soprattutto per quel che riguarda le modalità di retribuzione dei Wall Streeters.